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The Rights and Obligations of
States in Disputed Maritime
Areas: What Lessons Can Be
Learned from the Maritime
Boundary Dispute between Ghana
and C6te d'Ivoire?
Dr. Youri van Logchem*
ABSTRACT

Unilateral acts

undertaken in disputed maritime areas,

particularlyin relation to mineral resources, frequently lead to conflict
between states. Appraisalsof the scope that remains for unilateralism
in disputed maritime areas under internationallaw exist in both case
law and literature, but the precise scope remains shrouded in doubt.
The ruling of the tribunal in Guyana v. Suriname-building its
argumentationextensively on that of the InternationalCourt of Justice
(ICJ or Court) in the Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim
measures)-is significant in this regard, clarifying, at least to a certain
extent, the scope for unilateralconduct. Recently, in September 2017, in
the maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and CMte d'Ivoire, a
Special Chamber of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
(ITLOS) addressed the lawfulness of unilateral conduct by Ghana in a
disputed maritime area. The Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire judgment throws a
completely different light on the matter, compared to this earlier case
law, making revisiting the topic of what the rights and obligations of
states are in disputed maritime areas highly necessary and topical.

*
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I. INTRODUCTION
Frequently, states unilaterally undertake acts in disputed
maritime areas in relation to mineral resources. This might involve a
broad spectrum of categories of acts that are different in nature and
aim: for example, acts paving the way for activities related to mineral
resources to proceed through concessioning; activating these
concessions; conducting seismic work to map out the mineral resource
potential in a disputed maritime area; undertaking exploratory drilling
to assess whether earlier located deposits are commercially viable; and
appropriating mineral resources through exploitation.' Along this
range of conduct, different measures of damage will be caused to the
marine environment. 2 These acts, when undertaken unilaterally,
regularly engender conflict between claimant states; however, the
exact measure thereof varies with the specific situation and the type of
conduct concerned. 3 It is not easy to answer the question of what
unilateral acts can be lawfully undertaken in disputed maritime areas
in relation to mineral resources from the perspective of international
law-perhaps inherently so, due to the fact that the circumstances
surrounding a particular disputed maritime area are entwined with
determining this scope. 4 Scholars also continue to puzzle over this
5

issue.
The most recent addition to the case law relevant to the issue of
unilateralism in disputed maritime areas is the judgment on the

See generally Youri van Logchem, The Status of a Rule of Capture under
1.
International Law of the Sea with Regard to Offshore Oil and Gas Resource Related
Activities, 26 MICH. ST. INT'L L. REV. 195 (2018) [hereinafter Van Logchem Status].
Coraz6n Morales Siddayao, Oil and Gas on the Continental Shelf: Potentials
2.
and Constraints in the Asia-PacificRegion, 9 OCEANMGMT. 73, 95-96 (1984) (discussing
environmental issues of mining and other activities related to mineral resources).
See, e.g., Jared Bissinger, The Maritime Boundary Dispute Between
3.
Bangladesh and Myanmar: Motivations, Potential Solutions, and Implications, 10 ASIA
POL'Y 103, 109 (2010); Youri van Logchem, The Scope for Unilateralism in Disputed
Maritime Areas, in THE LIMITS OF MARITIME JURISDICTION 175 (Clive H. Schofield,

Seokwoo Lee & Moon-Sang Kwon eds., 2014) [hereinafter Van Logchem Unilateralism].
See Van Logchem Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 196-97 ("There thus
4.
remains a fair amount of uncertainty as to what scope is left for the unilateral conduct
of activities by States in areas of overlapping maritime claims, that are not covered by
provisional arrangements.").
See, e.g., BRITISH INST. OF INT'L & CoMP. LAW, REPORT ON THE OBLIGATIONS
5.
OF STATES UNDER ARTICLES 74(3) AND 83(3) OF UNCLOS IN RESPECT OF UNDELIMITED

MARITIME AREAS 18 (2016), www.biicl.org/documents/1 192_report
on the obligations-of states under articles_743_and_833_ofunclos inrespectof-u
[https://perma.cc/FN5D-YG6R]
ndelimited maritimeareas.pdfshowdocument=1
(archived Nov. 7, 2018) [hereinafter BIICL REPORT].
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merits in the dispute between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire (Ghana/C6te
d'Ivoire) that was handed down by a Special Chamber of ITLOS
(Special Chamber or Chamber) on September 23, 2017.6 Also relevant
in this regard is the interim measures order that was delivered by
ITLOS previous thereto, on April 25, 2015.7
More specifically, this Article will seek to analyze to what extent
Ghana/Cated'Ivoire has made a positive contribution on two issues:
first, the interpretation of paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC or Convention) as
such, predominantly the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize
continental shelf delimitation, given that it figured quite heavily in
this case; and, second-which is, to a certain extent, intermingled with
the first issue-the issue of what the rights and obligations of states
are in relation to mineral resources within disputed maritime areas on
the basis of Ghana/C6ted'Ivoire.
In addition, an alternative line of inquiry will be considered: the
question of whether, in relation to the remaining scope for
unilateralism in disputed maritime areas, there has been a blurring of
the distinction between lawful and unlawful unilateral acts because of
how the Chamber in Ghana/Cated'Ivoire framed its reasoning and the
conclusions it reached in relation thereto. There is a general caveat in
relation to the scope remaining for unilateralism in disputed waters
concerning mineral resources under international law: it has never
fully crystallized.8 After analyzing the case law rendered before
Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire, it could be stated with greater certainty that
unilateral conduct causing irreparable prejudice to rights would be
prohibited in a disputed maritime area.9 However, the judgment of the
Special Chamber in Ghana/C6ted'Ivoire, discussed in Part V.C., raises
some fundamental questions regarding the state of international law
10
in relation to unilateral conduct in disputed maritime areas.

6.
See generally Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire), Case No.
23, Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1 [hereinafter Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire
(Judgment)].
7.
See generally Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No.
23, Provisional Measures, Order of Apr. 25, 2015, 15 ITLOS Rep. 146 [hereinafter
Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire (Provisional Measures)].
8.
David H. Anderson & Youri van Logchem, Rights and Obligations in Areas of
Overlapping Maritime Claims, in THE SOUTH CHINA SEA DISPUTES AND LAw OF THE SEA
192, 206 (S. Jayakumar, Tommy Koh & Robert Beckman eds., 2014); Van Logchem
Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 195-97 ("It remains, however, impossible to provide a
specific set of norms defining the scope for unilateral activities in disputed maritime
areas that can find application in all cases.").
9.
See, e.g., Rainer Lagoni, Interim Measures Pending Maritime Delimitation
Agreements, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 345, 366 (1984) ("One can thus infer that any activity
which represents an irreparable prejudice to the final delimitation agreement.. .would
doubtless be prohibited under paragraph 3 of Articles 74/83[.]").
10.
See infra Part V.C.
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In terms of organization, this Article is divided into two parts. The
first Part will offer a more general introduction to the topic at hand,
while Part II will discuss unilateralism in disputed maritime areas.
Attention will be first directed towards disputed territorial sea,
exclusive economic zone (EEZs), and continental shelf areas as general
phenomena. This is necessary because the Special Chamber in
Ghana/Cite d'Ivoire was called upon to effect a delimitation of these
maritime zones conjointly. After shortly describing how disputed
maritime areas came into being and can be dealt with, the
international legal framework applicable to these areas in the period
prior to delimitation will be laid out. Relevant in this regard are
Articles 15, 74, and 83 of the LOSC.11 Special emphasis will be placed
on paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC, dealing with disputed
continental shelf areas and fulfilling a central role in the
argumentation of C6te d'Ivoire, as described in particular in Parts IV.A
and V.A; the modalities of this paragraph will be laid out in Parts
III.P-III.E. Paragraph 3 reads, in full, as follows:
Pending agreement as provided for in paragraph 1, the States concerned, in a
spirit of understanding and cooperation, shall make every effort to enter into
provisional arrangements of a practical nature and, during this transitional
period, not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of the final agreement. Such
arrangements shall be without prejudice to the final delimitation.

12

Two cases, respectively dealt with by the ICJ and an arbitral
tribunal and delivering their decisions some three decades apart, have
contributed to a more advanced understanding of how to interpret the
rules and obligations of international law that are relevant in
pinpointing the existing scope for unilateralism in disputed EEZ and
continental shelf areas: that is, in 1976 in Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf (interim measures) and in 2007 in Guyana v. Suriname.1 3 Both
cases involved disputed maritime areas, in which acts in relation to
mineral resources were undertaken unilaterally, and against which
one of the parties to the dispute protested. Guyana v. Suriname will be
looked at as to how paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC has been
understood in this case. Also, the ICJ's decision in Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf (interim measures) will be analyzed. In its award in
Guyana v. Suriname, the tribunal attributed a central role to what the
ICJ held in the aforementioned interim measures procedure in
interpreting paragraph 3.14 Guyana v. Suriname has been argued,
wrongly in the view of this author, to have resolved the conundrum of

11.
See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 18, 1982,
1833 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter LOSC].
12.
Id. arts. 74, 83.
See generally Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), Request
13.
for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 3 (Sept. 11);
Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007); see infra Part III.E.
See Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at 181-83, 186-91.
14.
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what scope is reserved for unilateralism in relation to mineral
resources within disputed EEZ/continental shelf areas. 15 Although the
decision in Guyana v. Suriname, heavily building on the ICJ's ruling
in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures), can be applauded
for clarifying, to a certain extent, the scope for unilateral acts relating
to mineral resources, the award and the reasoning of the tribunal has
tended to provoke questions of its own. One of these questions is the
extent to which it is appropriate to apply, by analogy, the findings of
this tribunal to disputed maritime areas in a general sense and, thus,
to consider it to be the final word on what scope remains for
unilateralism in disputed maritime areas. 1 6
An important aspect to Ghana/Cdted'Ivoire is that Ghana was on
the verge of starting to produce oil from previously drilled wells.1 7
Questions about the lawfulness of the unilateral acts by Ghana already
rose to the fore in the interim measures phase.1 8 The primary measure
of interim protection sought from the Special Chamber was to order
Ghana to put all mineral resource activity within the disputed area on
hold prior to delimitation.1 9 An important motivation for C6te d'Ivoire
to take this position was as follows: through the unilateral acts of
Ghana, the exclusivity of its sovereign rights over the continental shelf
was infringed upon to an extent that the resulting damage was
irreparable. 2 0 In formulating this argument, C~te d'Ivoire relied
heavily on the obligation incumbent on Ghana to not hamper or
jeopardize the final delimitation of a disputed continental shelf area,
which is contained in paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC. 2 1 During
the merits phase, this line of argument was repeated by CMte
d'Ivoire. 2 2 As a result, the Chamber was called upon to interpret the
wide and diversified range of unilateral conduct by Ghana in relation

15.
See Stephen Fietta, Guyana/Suriname, 102 AM. J. INT'L L. 119, 120 (2008);
Shigeki Sakamoto, Japan-ChinaDispute Over Maritime Boundary Delimitation-From
a Japanese Perspective, 51 JAPANESE Y.B. IN'L L. 98, 101-02 (2008).
16.
See Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at 183-92.
17.
See Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between
Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23,
Provisional Measures, Order of Apr. 25, 2015, 15 ITLOS Rep. 146, TT 76-77, 79, 84-85.
18.
Id. at 8.
19.
Id. at 2.
20.
See, e.g., id. at 10-11; see also infra Part V.A.
21.
Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures Submitted by the
Republic of C6te d'Ivoire, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No.
23, Feb. 27, 2015, at 8, https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/caseno.23
provmeas/C23_Request prov measures translationReg.pdf [https://perma.cc/U5SNSCC9] (archived Nov. 7, 2018) [hereinafter Request of C6te d'Ivoire].
22.
Volume I, Counter-Memorial of C6te d'Ivoire, Dispute Concerning
Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic
Ocean
(Ghana/Cate
d'Ivoire),
Case
No.
23,
Apr.
4,
2016,
at 237,
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case-no.23_merits/pleadings/Cou
nterMemorial finalVol.I1EngTR.pdf [https://perma.cclAJ7G-Y5SU] (archived Nov. 7,
2018) [hereinafter Counter-Memorial].
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to the disputed continental shelf area, inter alia, through the lens of
paragraph 3.23 New light is shone by the final judgment of the Special
Chamber on the content of the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize.
Standing in the way of a more elaborate analysis of this paragraph,
however, was the way in which C6te d'Ivoire committed its
submissions on this point to paper, as discussed in Part V.C.
The second Part of the Article will closely analyze the specifics of
the dispute between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire. It will look at the
arguments presented by the parties to the dispute, both in the phase
of the interim measures, in Parts IV.A-IV.B, and on the merits in Part
V. In both phases, arguments were presented by both sides to the
dispute about the (un)lawfulness of the unilateral conduct in the
disputed maritime area. Yet, an important difference was that the
states concerned approached this issue from very different angles. The
conclusions arrived at by the Special Chamber in these respective
stages in relation to the (un)lawfulness of this unilateral conduct will
also be discussed in Parts IV.C and V.C.
After discussing the intricacies of this dispute, the findings of the
Special Chamber will be placed in a broader context, by applying them
to the questions that lie at the core of this contribution: that is, was a
better understanding offered of the meaning of paragraph 3 of Article
83 in the LOSC, or more broadly, in relation to the issue of what the
rights and obligations of states are concerning disputed maritime
areas, specifically in relation to mineral resources?

II.

DISPUTED MARITIME AREAS AND UNILATERALISM

Disputed maritime areas were inevitably created due to the
proximity of certain coasts of states, combined with the expansion of
entitlements to maritime zones up to at least two hundred nautical
miles (nm) in the form of the EEZ and continental shelf, and the
24
extension of the breath of the territorial sea to twelve nm. Disputed
maritime areas are those areas where neighboring states have
advanced overlapping claims to maritime zones, be it the territorial
sea, EEZ, (extended) continental shelf, or a combination thereof. Areas
25
For
of this type are voluminous in the international landscape.
instance, African states have completed a little over half of the amount

Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
23.
and C8te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, ¶¶ 606-34.
ROBIN R. CHURCHILL & VAUGHAN LOWE, THE LAW OF THE SEA 147-48 (3d ed.
24.
1999); Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 192-95.
Husain M. Al Baharna, Legal Implications of Maritime Boundary Disputes
25.
(With Special Reference to the Gulf), 68 Y.B. ISLAMIC & MIDDLE E. L. 68, 70 (1994); Clive
H. Schofield, Ever More Lines in the Sea: Advances in the Spatial Governance of Marine
Space, in OCEAN LAW AND POLICY: 20 YEARS UNDER UNCLOS 387, 398-99 (Carlos
Esp6sito et al. eds., 2016).
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of delimitation exercises they can go through in total; however, some
of these concern boundaries that have been partially delimited, but
leave the remainder undefined. 2 6
Disputed maritime areas can create different levels of conflicts
between coastal states having overlapping claims, ranging from no
problems arising between them to disputes being frequent.
Undertaking unilateral acts in connection with mineral resources in a
disputed maritime area is particularly prone to prompting a response
from the other claimant state. Two ways can be identified as to how
claimant states can respond to unilateral conduct: 2 7 protesting and
taking physical action.2 8 Yet, there are fundamental differences
between these types of responses: protesting (e.g., through diplomatic
channels) is a lower intensity response than formulating a physical
reaction (e.g., through sending navy vessels to the area concerned in
an attempt to put a halt to unilateral conduct). 2 9 Giving a reaction to
a unilateral act may be called for in certain circumstances and might
prevent a state from being confronted with the argument that by
staying silent it has acquiesced in the lawfulness of that conduct; or,
alternatively, in the claim of the other state over the area.3 0 An
example illustrating the importance of giving some response is the
dispute currently under consideration, with Ghana contending that
through CMte d'Ivoire's silence in connection with the disputed area,
and the related conduct set in motion therein, it acquiesced in an
equidistance boundary line.3 1
Article 15 of the LOSC is the relevant provision in case
overlapping territorial sea claims arise. It contains the following

26.
BHCL REPORT, supra note 5, at 85.
27.
See Van Logchem Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 175 (saying neighboring
states usually feel compelled to respond to unilateral activities conducted in a disputed
maritime area).
28.
Youri van Logchem, Exploration and Exploitationof Oil and Gas Resources
in MaritimeAreas of Overlap: the Falklands (Malvinas), 28 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 29, 38
(2017) [hereinafter van Logchem Exploration].
29.
For example, after Guyana allowed an oil rig to be placed within a disputed
maritime area, to commence with exploratory drilling, Suriname put a halt to this
conduct by sending its naval vessels. The tribunal concluded that Suriname breached
Article 2(4) of the United Nations Charter and general international law. It was
particularly held against Suriname, that it issued an ultimatum: the rig would need to
"leave the area at once, or the consequences will be yours." See Guyana v. Suriname, 30
R.I.A.A. 1, IT 445, 476 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
30.
M. Shah Alam & A. Al Faruque, The Problem of Delimitationof Bangladeshs
Maritime Boundaries with India and Myanmar: Prospects for a Solution, 25 INT'L J.
MARINE & COASTAL L. 405, 408-09 (2010).
31.
Another example is that silence on the part of Turkey was construed by
Greece in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf as coming to the former's detriment, in that it
acquiesced in Greece's continental shelf claim. See, e.g., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
Case (Greece v. Turk.), Request for the Indication of Interim Measures of Protection,
Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 36-37 (Sept. 11) (Stassinopoulos, J., dissenting) ("Turkey never
protested against that exercise and never claimed any rights whatever over the Greek
continental shelf."); see infra Part V.B.
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delimitation rule: the territorial sea boundary is the equidistance line,
unless another line is justified by a special circumstance or historic
title. 3 2 This same solution applies in the shape of an interim rule to
the period preceding delimitation of the disputed territorial sea area,
with the same caveat: no historic title or special circumstance can be
in play.3 3 In the absence of historic title or special circumstances, the
equidistance line would signify the outer point up to which a claimant
can exercise sovereignty prior to delimitation.
Beyond the outer limit of the territorial sea, the EEZ and the
continental shelf will enter into the picture. Disputes concerning EEZ
and continental shelf areas arise regularly in the international
landscape. In fact, the majority of disputed areas remaining
outstanding today involve one or a combination of these two maritime
zones. 3 4 States can delimit their disputed EEZ or continental shelf
area by way of a negotiated boundary agreement between the coastal
states or through a delimitation effected by an international court or
tribunal. 3 5 Paragraph 1 of Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC contains the
basic rules governing the delimitation of overlapping EEZ or
36
continental shelf claims: the ultimate boundary has to be equitable.
These identical provisions have been regularly criticized for providing
37
However, this
limited guidance to states having overlapping claims.
has not prevented states from reaching delimitation agreements
38
successfully; moreover, practice in this regard continues to expand.
Another option for the states concerned is bringing a disputed EEZ or
continental shelf area under the reach of a cooperative arrangement.
Most of these arrangements can be considered provisional
arrangements in the sense of paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the

LOSC. 3 9

&

32.
Anderson & Van Logchem, supranote 8, at 195-97.
33.
2 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF THE LAW OF THE SEA 1982: A
COMMENTARY 135 (Satya N. Nandan & Shabtai Rosenne eds., 1993).
34.
Tim Martin, Energy and InternationalBoundaries, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK
ON INTERNATIONAL ENERGY LAW 181 (Kim Talus ed., 2014); Anderson & Van Logchem,
supra note 8, at 192, 198.
35.
Tullio Treves, A System for Law of the Sea Dispute Settlement, in THE LAW OF
THE SEA: PROGRESS AND PROSPECTS 417-18 (David Freestone et al. eds., 2006).
36.
See, e.g., Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Tunisia v. Libyan Arab
Jamahiriya), Judgment, 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 18, 59 (Feb. 24) ("The delimitation must also
be effected in conformity with equitable principles[]").
See, e.g., Malcom D. Evans, MaritimeDelimitationafter Denmark v. Norway:
37.
Back to the Future?, in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN
BROWNLIE 156 (Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999); VICTOR PRESCOTT
CLIVE SCHOFIELD, THE MARITIME POLITICAL BOUNDARIES OF THE WORLD 246 (2d ed.
2005).
Alex G. Oude Elferink, InternationalLaw and Negotiated and Adjudicated
38.
Maritime Boundaries: A Complex Relationship, 58 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 231, 235-36
(2015).
For example, the preamble to a provisional arrangement concluded between
39.
Algeria and Tunisia, establishing a provisional maritime boundary between the coasts
of the two States, explicitly refers to paragraph 3 of articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC. See
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There are concurrent claims of coastal states to sovereignty
(concerning the territorial sea), or sovereign rights (pertaining to the
EEZ or continental shelf), with regard to the same maritime area prior
to its delimitation. 40 However, the entitlements to maritime zones and
related sovereignty, sovereign, or jurisdictional rights of coastal states
over a disputed maritime area already exist prior to delimitation. 4 1 In
a way, the area of overlapping claims appertains to all of the claimants
involved prior to delimitation, or so it has been argued. 4 2 However that
may be, there may be uncertainty over the extent to which states can
exercise their rights in relation to disputed maritime areas. 4 3 But there
is an important difference between the EEZ and the continental
shelf.4 4 The sovereign rights coastal states have over the continental
shelf are inherent and exist ab initio and dejure.4 5 This is not the case
concerning the EEZ: rights are created by making an explicit claim to
an EEZ. 4 6 Usually, the aspect of inherency of states' rights over the
continental shelf has been argued to imply that sovereign rights
automatically cover the mineral resources embedded therein. 4 7
Interestingly, the Special Chamber's reasoning in the judgment on the
merits in Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire seems to be at odds herewith, raising
the suggestion that delimitation is constitutive of rights. 48

Agreement on Provisional Arrangements for the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between the Republic of Tunisia and the People's Democratic Republic of Algeria, Feb.
11, 2002, 2238 U.N.T.S. 197, 208.
40.
Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 198.
41.
Van Logehem Exploration,supra note 28, at 42.
42.
See, e.g., Enrico Milano & Irini Papanicolopulu, State Responsibility in
Disputed Areas on Land and at Sea, 71 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR AUSLANDISCHES OFFENTLICHES
RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT 587, 589-590 (2011) ("Till their delimitation, disputed sea
areas might be considered, up to a certain extent, as belonging to either of the parties to
the dispute, without there being one with a definitive claim.").
43.
VICTOR PRESCOTT, THE GULF OF THAILAND: MARITIME LIMITS TO CONFLICT
AND COOPERATION 17 (1998).
44.
Case Concerning the Continental Shelf (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya v. Malta),
Judgment, 1985 I.C.J. 13, 24-25 (June 3).
45.
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;
Federal Republic of Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, IT 19, 39
(Feb. 20); MALCOLM D. EVANS, RELEVANT CIRCUMSTANCES AND MARITIME DELIMITATION
55 (1989).
46.
See LOSC, supra note 11, art. 57 ("The exclusive economic zone shall not
extend beyond 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured.").
47.
See, e.g., Masahiro Miyoshi, The Basic Concept of Joint Development of
Hydrocarbon Resources on the Continental Shelf with Special Reference to the
Discussions at the East-West Centre Workshops on the South-East Asian Seas, 3 INT'L J.
ESTUARINE & COASTAL L. 1, 7 (1988).
48.
Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, T 591; see infra Part VI.
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III. DISPUTED MARITIME AREAS: THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
FRAMEWORK

For some time, the waters located off the adjacent coasts of Ghana
and C6te d'Ivoire have been known to contain significant deposits of
mineral resources. 4 9 Tullow Oil, having its primary seat in London,
was the petroleum company primarily concessioned by Ghana to
conduct a variety of exploratory and exploitative work related to
mineral resources in the disputed maritime area. 50 Significant
amounts of deposits were struck in several locations of the disputed
area: fields showing particular promise were Jubilee field and
Tweneboa, Enyenra, and Ntomme (these are colloquially known as
"TEN").
It is difficult to pinpoint with precision when the dispute over the
maritime boundary materialized between the two states. Complicating
this is C~te d'Ivoire's inactivity in relation to the area concerned, at
least for some period of time.5 1 According to Ghana, C6te d'Ivoire's
silence spanned several decades, 52 which fed the Ghana's belief that
Cdte d'Ivoire had agreed that those parts located on Ghana's side of an
equidistance boundary, including those rich in mineral resources,
belonged to Ghana. 53 At some point in time, according to Ghana in
2011,54 Cbte d'Ivoire actively started to claim areas beyond the
equidistance boundary line in relation to which Ghana had begun
extensive mineral resource activities. 55 Ghana's activities required
making significant previous investments (e.g., in connection with
enabling installations to move into position, and their operation
coming at great cost). 5 6 This made clear that the oil companies were
heavily invested in the area. In this light, it was seriously important
for Ghana that the Chamber would determine that the disputed areas
concerned would be on Ghana's side of the boundary after delimitation.

49.
Ghana told to stop new drilling in disputed waters, BBC (Apr. 26, 2015),
https://www.bbc.cominews/business-32472101 [https://perma.cclV2GZ-ATCT] (archived
Nov..7, 2018).
50.
Id.
51.
Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶ 130.
Id. ¶ 102.
52.
53.
Id.
William Wallis, Oil: Nation eager to remain master of its own destiny, FIN.
54.
2011),
https://www.ft.com/content/f39dba34-236a-liel-af98(Dec.
14,
TIMES
00144feabdcO [https://perma.ccl59GW-SBNL] (archived Nov. 7, 2018) ("Officials say they
first got wind of this when the Ivorian government wrote to oil companies requesting
that they cease activities in waters long considered to be on Ghana's side.").
Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶f 130, 189.
55.
56.
Written Statement of Ghana, Request for the Prescription of Provisional
Measures Submitted by the Republic of C6te d'Ivoire, Dispute Concerning Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and C~te dIvoire in the Atlantic Ocean
(Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Mar. 23, 2015, at 6-19 [hereinafter Written
Statement of Ghana], https://www.itlos.org/
fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case-no.23_provmeas/Vol._I_-_WrittenState
ment of GhanaFINAL.pdf [https://perma.cc/N2DQ-ZTRS] (archived Nov. 7, 2018).
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According to Ghana, the observed silence by C6te d'Ivoire had by
then come to amount to its acquiescence. This was due to C6te d'Ivoire's
nonreaction in relation to Ghana's activities, which had been ongoing
for a significant period, providing C6te d'Ivoire with many
opportunities to protest. 5 7 The silence or inaction of a state in a
situation where the converse (i.e., taking some action) was called upon
may amount to acquiescence, in that rights are established under
international law to the detriment of the silent state. 5 8 By this same
token, and in defining what was at the heart of the dispute, Ghana
made it clear that it was not involved in a dispute about delimitation;5 9
rather, the issue was the confirmation of a pre-existing boundary that
was developed through acquiescence.
After learning Ghana had engaged in a wide range of unilateral
activity in the disputed area, C6te d'Ivoire approached petroleum
companies that had received concessions to conduct work in nine oil
and gas blocks from Ghana. 60 C6te d'Ivoire, in a letter,6 1 ordered these
companies to abandon operations and refrain from acting on further
commitments there as well. 6 2 Discoveries of large quantities of mineral
resources were argued by Ghana to have created this newfound
interest on the part of Cbte d'Ivoire in the area concerned. 63 Cute
d'Ivoire denied that its protest was linked to Ghana's discovery of
mineral resources, producing a different version of events: Ghana knew
that the area had become a subject of dispute between them, certainly
as early as 1992.64 Although fully aware that the area concerned did
not exclusively and uncontestably belong to Ghana, 6 5 Ghana did not
alter its behavior accordingly by adopting restraint in relation to the
disputed area, which would have been the appropriate response from
the view of international law according to C6te d'Ivoire. 6 6
A. Establishinga Single Maritime Boundary
In the maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and C6te
d'Ivoire, the Special Chamber was requested to establish a single
maritime boundary for the seabed and superjacent waters, covering
conjointly the territorial sea, EEZ, and (extended) continental shelf. 6 7

57.
Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶¶ 102.
58.
Nuno S6rgio Marques Antunes, Acquiescence, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA
OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 3 (R. Wolfrum ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
59.
Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. T 69.
60.
Id. ¶ 134.
61.
Id.
62.
Wallis, supra note 54 (saying officials first found out about the problems
through a letter from the Ivorian government).
63.
Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. TT 110-11, 131.
64.
Id. TT 105, 130, 171.
65.
Id. T 585.
66.
Id. NT 135, 562.
67.
See, e.g., id. T 87.
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Because the coasts of Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire are adjacent to each
other, 6 8 their entitlements to all maritime zones, which are measured
from the designated baselines, overlap from the point where the land
boundary terminates. The LOSC is silent on what the applicable legal
rules are concerning a single maritime boundary-for instance,
whether Articles 74 and 83 of the LOSC have any application in its
determination has not been explicated in the international case law.
International courts and tribunals have simply assumed that these
Articles are applicable whenever they were called upon to determine a
single maritime boundary.6 9 The Special Chamber in Ghana/Cdte
d'Ivoire considered that the maritime boundary for the territorial sea,
EEZ, and the (extended) continental shelf could be delimited by using
the same methodology. 7 0

B. Paragraph3 of Article 83 of the LOSC
Delimitation of the maritime boundary between the coasts of
Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire was one aspect of their dispute on which the
Special Chamber was asked to rule. In addition, the Chamber was
faced with an ancillary issue: were the unilateral activities undertaken
concerning mineral resources in the disputed maritime area lawful
from the view of international law?7 1
Cbte d'Ivoire took the following position, inspired in part by the
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize contained in paragraph 3 of
Article 83 of the LOSC: pending continental shelf delimitation, a
moratorium was imposed on unilateral acts concerning mineral
resources. 7 2 Upon learning of the objections of CMte d'Ivoire, Ghana,
rather than abandon its unilateral conduct, intensified its level of
activity in the disputed area; this was construed by CMte d'Ivoire as
posing a breach of paragraph 3 as well.7 3
Paragraph 3 will usually become relevant if states whose coasts
lie opposite or adjacent to each other have been unsuccessful in

Id. ¶ 64.
68.
See, e.g., Case Concerning the Land and Maritime Boundary between
69.
Cameroon and Nigeria (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Judgment, 2002 I.C.J. Rep. 303, ¶¶ 28586 (Oct. 10); Case Concerning Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, 1 179 (Jan. 27); Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
Between Bangladesh and Myanmar in the Bay of Bengal (Bangladesh v. Myanmar),
Case No. 16, Judgment of Mar. 14, 2012, 10 ITLOS Rep. 4; Arbitration Between
Barbados and the Republic of Trinidad and Tobago, Relating to the Delimitation of the
Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf Between Them (Barbados v.
Trinidad and Tobago), 27 R.I.A.A. 147, IT 234-35 (Apr. 11, 2016).
70.
Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. I 261-63, 409.
71.
See id. 1 542 (saying C6te d'Ivoire submits that Ghana's conduct in the
disputed maritime area violated international law).
Id. ¶T 135, 608, 622.
72.
73.
Id. 1 134.
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delimiting their overlapping claims over the same continental shelf
area.74
This paragraph imposes two obligations tailored toward different
aims on claimant states pending delimitation: seeking cooperative
arrangements, in the form of the obligation to "make every effort to
enter into provisional arrangements of a practical nature"; and
observing restraint, so as "not to jeopardize or hamper the reaching of
the final agreement." 7 5 Hence, in terms of overall aim, paragraph 3 of
Article 83 of the LOSC seeks to steer between cooperation and
abstention. 7 6
At the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea
(Third Conference), states' positions on the design of paragraph 3 fell
effectively along two-lines." One group of states argued for using a
unilateral equidistance boundary line as an interim rule. 7 8 This
boundary line would come to divide a disputed continental shelf area
and form the outer point up to which a claimant could exercise
jurisdiction pending delimitation.7 9 Heavily opposed to this approach
was another group of states, which encouraged the conclusion of
provisional arrangements between claimants as an applicable interim
rule.8 0 The gist of their proposals was that a failure to come to a
cooperative arrangement would activate the interim solution of a
81
moratorium on economic conduct in a disputed area.

74.
By combining this with that the LOSC operates on the assumption of there
being no underpinning sovereignty disputes, meaning that clarity exists in the
geographical extent of the coastal state's rights, it may be that disputed maritime areas
where interweaving sovereign issues exist are beyond the reach of paragraph 3 of article
83 of the LOSC. See Van Logchem Exploration,supra note 28, at 42.
75.
See, e.g., Robert Beckman, Legal Framework for Joint Development in the
South China Sea, in UN CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF THE SEA AND THE SOUTH CHINA
SEA 254 (S. Wu, M. Valencia et al. eds., 2014).
76.
See Kamal Hossain, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and
ProvisionalArrangements Relating to Activities in Disputed MaritimeAreas, in LAW OF
THE SEA, FROM GROTIUS TO THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR THE LAW OF THE SEA;
LIBER AMIcoRUM JUDGE HUGO CAMINos 677 (Lilian del Castillo ed., 2015) ("83(3) ... is
an important aspect of the Convention's objective of strengthening peace and friendly
relations between nations and of settling disputes peacefully.").
77.
STEPHEN FIETTA & ROBIN CLEVERLY, A PRACTITIONER'S GUIDE TO MARITIME
BOUNDARY DELIMITATION 84-85 (2016); Lagoni, supra note 9, at 349 (saying paragraph
3's requirements received little interest from the States participating in the Third Law
of the Sea Conference).
78.
See Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 199-205.
79.
See, e.g., Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea,
Netherlands: Draft Article on Delimitation Between States with Opposite or Adjacent
Coasts, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.14 (July 19, 1974) (explaining that if no agreement
is reached, neither state should claim areas beyond the equidistance boundary).
80.
See, e.g., Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, Ireland:
Draft Article on Delimitationof Areas of ContinentalShelf Between NeighbouringStates,
U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.2/L.43 (Aug. 6, 1974).
81.
See, e.g., 9 THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
DOCUMENTS 405-11 (Renate Platz6der ed., 1982).
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After the two doctrinally split groups reached agreement on a
text, 82 and after paragraph 3 of Article 83 was included in the
Convention, critical voices soon started to emerge, questioning the
merits of this provision.8 3 Opinions as to the usefulness of paragraph
3 of Article 83 of the LOSC can be seen to have undergone some
changes from the moment of its introduction into its framework.
Primarily, the ruling in Guyana v. Suriname has brought about a
change in thinking as to the importance of paragraph 3, although it
has not been immune from criticism either. Since then, opinion has
shifted largely towards the paragraph not being empty but, to the
contrary, carrying actual weight. 84
Despite this trend, the exact significance of this obligation
remains the subject of debate, varying from being of mere minor
importance to fulfilling a significant role in limiting acts of
unilateralism. 8 5 The decision of the Special Chamber in Ghana/C6te
d'Ivoire gives cause for revisiting this statement as to the usefulness of
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC, swinging the pendulum in favor
of the view that paragraph 3 is mere rhetoric. By throwing a completely
different light on the importance of paragraph 3, the Chamber
arguably interpreted the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize in a
way to render it almost meaningless.
C. Interpretingthe Obligation to Seek ProvisionalArrangements
In the case between Ghana and CMte d'Ivoire, the latter did not
allege in its formal submissions that Ghana had committed a breach of
86
As a result, the
the obligation to seek provisional arrangements.
obligation to seek provisional arrangements played a more marginal
role in this case, with the Special Chamber laying out in more broad
87
strokes what this obligation requires of the states concerned.
However, in its pleadings, C6te d'Ivoire did suggest that breaches of
88
This
the obligation to seek provisional arrangements had occurred.
seems to be the reason that the tribunal addressed the meaning of this

FIErrA & CLEVERLY, supra note 77, at 25.
82.
Lucius Caflisch, The Delimitation of Marine Spaces between States with
83.
Opposite or Adjacent Coasts, in 1 A HANDBOOK OF THE NEW LAW OF THE SEA 495 (Ren6Jean Dupuy & Daniel Vignes eds., 1991).
84.
See, e.g., Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at 191-92.
85.
See, e.g., Hossain, supra note 76, at 674-76.
86.
Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, T 628.
87.
Id. T 626-27.
88.
Counter-Memorial, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire),
Case No. 23, Apr. 4, 2016, at 235-36.
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obligation, albeit to a more minimal extent, as compared with the
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize.8 9
In general terms, under the first obligation encountered in
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC, claimant states are required, in
a spirit of understanding and cooperation, to make every effort to enter
into provisional arrangements of a practical nature.9 0 An implication
of this is that, when negotiations on provisional arrangements have
begun, the states concerned must approach these with a spirit of
understanding and cooperation. This implies that statbs have to be
considerate of each other's rights and positions in relation to a disputed
maritime area, and must show a cooperative attitude.9 1 In Guyana v.
Suriname, the tribunal emphasized the importance of developing a
disputed
maritime
area
pursuant
to
agreed
provisional
92
arrangements.
This is a continuation of a line of argument that
international courts and tribunals have been advocating for a while
now: the favored response to deal with difficulties that can emerge from
having overlapping claims is for the states involved to seek and agree
on cooperative arrangements.9 3 The thrust of this approach is that,
whenever feasible, provisional arrangements covering the disputed
maritime area in the period that precedes delimitation should be
created. This would enable the states concerned to mutually pluck
economic fruits from developing a disputed area; otherwise, such
development probably has to be deferred to until after delimitation.
Despite the measure of importance ascribed to cooperative
arrangements, there is a caveat. The tribunal in its award in Guyana
v. Suriname framed the extent of the positive obligation under
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC in the following way: states are
under a duty to make good faith attempts to come to a provisional
arrangement, constituting an obligation of conduct. 9 4 A breach of this
obligation is avoided when earnest efforts are made by the states
concerned at arriving at this result.
D. Interpretingthe Obligation to Not Hamper or Jeopardize
In contrast, playing a prominent part in this case was the negative
obligation in paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC: the obligation to
not hamper or jeopardize reaching a delimitation agreement. C6te
d'Ivoire relied heavily on this obligation, and alleged that Ghana

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

See, e.g., Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶ 607.
See Van Logchem Status, supra note 1, at 225-27.
See Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 205-06.
Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, T 460 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
See Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at 191-92.
Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. ¶ 461.
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committed several breaches thereof. 9 5 Clearly, the idea of
or restraint underpins the obligation to not hamper or
delimitation. 96 More specifically, it embodies the general
discouraging certain unilateral acts from being undertaken
to a disputed continental shelf area. 9 7
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abstention
jeopardize
thought of
in relation

There are two sides to the obligation not to hamper or jeopardize,
in that it relates to both actions and reactions of claimant states
undertaken concerning a disputed continental shelf area.9 8 The
following rationale underlies this obligation: were claimant states to
continue to act unilaterally in relation to their disputed continental
shelf area, or if they were to react in a particular way to unilateral
conduct, the difficulties in reaching the final delimitation would be
enhanced as a result (be it through their own efforts in the shape of a
delimitation agreement or submission of the maritime boundary
dispute to an international court or tribunal).9 9 The converse side to
the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize, in that a reaction to a
unilateral act can have a detrimental effect on the chances of reaching
the final delimitation, is illustrated in Suriname's reaction to Guyana
allowing an oil rig to move into a disputed maritime area, in order to
initiate exploratory drilling.1 00
Although there is clarity in terms of spirit (i.e., to exercise
restraint), the precise sphere of operation of the obligation is far less
straightforwardly established, with the paragraph itself failing to
single out specific acts surpassing the threshold of non-hampering or
jeopardizing, therewith leaving the material reach of this obligation
unspecified. The two words "hamper" and "jeopardize" are central to
developing an understanding of the meaning of this obligation and
assisting in ascertaining the types of unilateral conduct that are
captured under its reach. These terms cannot be treated as synonyms,
however. The insertion of these two terms injects a distinction into
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC: acts having an effect of either
hampering or jeopardizing must be abjured prior to delimitation of the
disputed continental shelf area. Illustrating that the words convey

See, e.g., Counter-Memorial, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the
95.
Maritime Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te
d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Apr. 4, 2016, at 235-42; see infra Part V.A.
BIICL REPORT, supra note 5, at 23-24; Xinjun Zhang, Why the 2008 Sino96.
Japanese Consensus on the East China Sea Has Stalled: Good Faith and Reciprocity
Considerations in Interim Measures Pending a Maritime Boundary Delimitation, 42
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 53, 57-58 (2011) ("Generally, the first obligation is labeled as an
'obligation to negotiate in good faith' while the second is understood to create a specific
duty to exercise mutual restraint.").
See Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 207; Van Logchem
97.
Unilateralism, supranote 3, at 179.
98.
See Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at 195.
99.
Caflisch, supranote 83, at 495; Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at
48-49.
100. Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, TT 445, 476 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
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different meanings is the use of the disjunctive, "or," which separates
the two words of "hampering" and "jeopardizing."10 1
Because of the inclusion of the words "every effort" in the
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize contained in paragraph 3 of
Article 83 of the LOSC, 10 2 the obligation is transformed into an
obligation of conduct. 1 03 The ordinary meaning of the phrase "every
effort" would suggest this indeed is the case. The effect this good faith
component has on the content of the negative obligation in paragraph
3 of Article 83 of the LOSC is to require that the states concerned must
have made genuine efforts to avoid engaging in acts with a subsequent
effect of hampering or jeopardizing the final delimitation. An
alternative reading of the language of paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the
LOSC is that the requirement of "every effort" solely operates in
connection with the obligation to seek provisional arrangements; this
would arguably better comport with the meaning of not hampering or
jeopardizing delimitation, which is akin to a prohibition.1 04 However,
this interpretation is problematic: if the words "shall make every
effort" are not linked to the second limb of the sentence contained in
paragraph 3, it would be incomplete and grammatically incorrect.
However, the addition of the words "shall make every effort" implies
that the obligation could be violated if the result expected by one state
(i.e., reaching delimitation) has not been achieved, or is regarded to
have been complicated by one state, due to acts of unilateralism
undertaken by another claimant.
The extent of the limitation imposed by the obligation to not
hamper or jeopardize is dependent on an act having a hampering or
jeopardizing effect on the successful completion of the final
delimitation. However, whether a unilateral act hampers or
jeopardizes varies with the specific circumstances of the case. 105 So,
there is a variable in play: a unilateral act may have an effect of
hampering or jeopardizing reaching a delimitation agreement between
certain states but may not have a similar effect between other states.
Hence, categorizing acts caught under the obligation to not hamper or
jeopardize cannot be defined in abstracto:the specifics of the disputed
maritime area will be critical in this regard. This view is supported by
Judge Paik's separate opinion in Ghana/C6ted'Ivoire,10 6 also arguing

101.
102.
LAw

IN

BIICL REPORT, supra note 5, at 24.
Catherine Redgwell, InternationalRegulationof Energy Activities, in ENERGY
EUROPE:

NATIONAL,

EU AND

INTERNATIONAL

REGULATION

61

(Martha

Roggenkamp, Catherine Redgwell et al. eds., 2016).
103. BIICL REPORT, supra note 5, at 13.
AND
INTERIM
SUN-PYO
KIM, MARITIME
DELIMITATION
104. See,
e.g.,
ARRANGEMENTS IN NORTH EAST ASIA 76 (2004); Zhang, supra note 96, at 57-58.

105. Anderson & Van Logchem, supranote 8, at 206; Van Logchem Unilateralism,
supra note 3, at 185-86.
106. See generally Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No.
23,
Separate
Opinion
of
Judge
Paik,
Sept.
23,
2017,
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against designing closed categories of lawful" and "unlawful" activities
in disputed continental shelf areas, as discussed in Part V.B.2.
E. Paragraph3 of Article 83 of the LOSC: What Can Be Learned from
the Case Law Rendered Priorto Ghana/Cdte d'Ivoire?
There are two previous rulings (i.e., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(interim measures) and Guyana v. Suriname) that have contributed to
a better understanding of the content of paragraph 3 of Article 83 of
the LOSC, the latter in a direct manner and the former in an indirect
manner. Although the decision of the ICJ in Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf (interim measures) was rendered before the LOSC entered into
force, and despite being an interim measures procedure, it remains
important in interpreting paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC. The
continued relevance of Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim
measures) is due to the fact that the final ruling the tribunal delivered
in Guyana v. Suriname replicates largely, although with some minor
variations, the reasoning of the ICJ from this earlier decision.1 0 7 In
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures), the ICJ in its
decision elevated the standard of unilateral acts having an effect of
causing irreparability to a state's rights as the relevant rule of thumb
to distinguish between lawful and unlawful uses of a disputed
continental shelf area.1 0 8
However, whatever their merits may be, there are various reasons
for these two decisions not pinning down the scope for unilateralism in
relation to mineral resources in a definitive way. Importantly, Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures) was an interim measures
procedure that operated according to its own rules, limiting its
usefulness in interpreting paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC. 0 9
Because a lower threshold than irreparability is perceived under
hampering or jeopardizing, more acts than merely those surpassing the
standard of irreparability would be captured thereunder. But, more
importantly, and this builds on the argument presented above, that
each disputed maritime area has its own intricacies and surrounding
dynamics renders a discussion of what scope remains for unilateralism
1 10
in such areas in conclusive terms inapposite.

https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/caseno.23_merits/C23_Judgmen
t_23.09.2017_SepOpPaik-orig.pdf [https://perma.ccl7Y3K-7GDA] (archived Nov. 7,
2018).
107. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 218; Van Logchem Status, supra
note 1, at 237.
108. The ICJ's position seems to bear a close connection with the general rule of
international law of causing no harm to rights of another State. See BlICL REPORT, supra
note 5, at 20.
109. See Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at 186-91.
110. Anderson & Van Logchem, supra note 8, at 206; Van Logchem Unilateralism,
supra note 3, at 186.
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1. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures)
As regards those parts of the disputed continental shelf area of the
Aegean Sea where Turkey sought to map out the potential for mineral
resources through seismic work and scientific research,1 1 1 Greece
claimed to have exclusive entitlements, which encompassed a sole right
to collect information about the composition of the seabed. 11 2 Greece
argued that through unilateral seismic work, its sovereign rights were
breached and their exclusive character infringed upon.1 1 3 Such
infringement was sufficient, according to Greece, for the ICJ to indicate
measures of interim protection.1 1 4 However, beyond the infringement
upon the aspect of exclusivity, seismic work also caused irreparability
to Greece's sovereign rights.1 5
In dealing with this argument, the ICJ acknowledged a risk of
prejudice accompanying unilateral seismic work. 1 16 However, it
concluded in a general sense that unilateral conduct of a mere
transitional character, which encompassed seismic work, did not have
a risk of prejudicing the rights of another claimant state
irremediably.11 7 So, there seems to have been a lack of the required
urgency, not enabling the Court to indicate measures of interim
protection. Particularly important in this regard is that the resultant
prejudice was found to be of a nature that could be repaired ex post
facto (i.e., after the ICJ would have handed down its ruling on the
merits as to where the continental shelf boundary lies). Hence, the
materialization of the prejudice connected to unilateral seismic work
was made dependent on the assumption that the area in question
would ultimately be on Greece's side of the established boundary.
However, the ICJ did not generalize this position, in that every
unilateral act carrying the risk of prejudice when undertaken in a
disputed maritime area was acceptable. Central to this determination
was the following question: can the harm caused through unilateral
conduct be financially compensated after delimiting the continental
shelf boundary? One type of act threatening the rights of another state
with irreparability was placing an installation in contact with the
disputed continental shelf area.' 1 8 Therefore, according to the ICJ in
Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim measures), it could not

111. Oral Arguments on the Request for Interdiction of Interim Measures of
Protection, Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), 1976 I.C.J. Pleadings
79, 141 (Sept. 11, 1976).
112. Id. at 101.
113. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), Request for the
Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 3, T 26 (Sept. 11).
114. Id. ¶ 32.
115. Id. T 30.
116. Id. T 31.
117. Id. ¶ 30.
118. Id.
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commence pendente litis.119 Furthermore, exploratory drilling and the
actual appropriation of mineral resources, or making attempts thereto,
would likewise lead to irreparability. These acts thus fell in the
category of unilateral acts concerning a disputed continental shelf area
that would have merited the indication of interim measures of
protection. 120 In the overall analysis of the ICJ, there being a physical
component attached to a unilateral act was critical, in that the
continental shelf would have been somehow modified. 12 1 A similar
emphasis can be seen in the dispute between Guyana and
Suriname, 12 2 on which there is more in the next subpart.
2. Guyana v. Suriname
Now, this Article turns to the maritime boundary dispute between
Guyana and Suriname. The main emphasis in this subpart will be on
retracing the steps of the tribunal, which led it to ultimately attribute
a central role to the ICJ's decision in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(interim measures) in its own interpretation of the content of
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC. Both parties to the dispute
relied on paragraph 3, claiming that it had been breached by the other
state. 12 3 The primary event instigating the formulation of arguments
by either of the parties to this dispute based on paragraph 3 was a
petroleum company, licensed only by Guyana, moving a drilling rig into
a disputed area to begin exploratory drilling.1 24 Guyana argued that
the positioned oil rig was allowed to unilaterally drill in the disputed
area: no discernible differences exist between drilling and seismic
work, both being lawful exploratory activities.1 2 5 Suriname based its
argument on the opposite view, at the core of which was the dissimilar
nature of the two acts. 1 26 An appraisal of the lawfulness of drilling and
seismic work had to be informed by different considerations, in the
view of Suriname. 1 27 Suriname construed Guyana, who had
authorized exploratory drilling, to have altered the status quo that
existed in the disputed area: that is, to a degree that the chances of
effecting a delimitation were impeded upon. 1 28

119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. ¶ 32.
122. Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶¶ 468-69 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
123. Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at 181.
124. Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1 150.
125. Reply of the Republic of Guyana, Volume I, Guyana v. Suriname, Apr. 1, 2006,
at 141-43.
126. Rejoinder of the Republic of Suriname, Volume I, Guyana v. Suriname, Sept.
1, 2006, at 128.
127. Id.
128. See, e.g., id. at 129-30.
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The tribunal interpreted the two obligations included in
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC1 2 9 in a way that the imposition
of a moratorium on economic activities pending delimitation needed to
be
avoided.1 3 0
In distinguishing between permissible and
impermissible unilateral conduct concerning disputed continental
shelf areas, the tribunal assessed whether "the risk of physical damage
to the seabed or subsoil" accompanied a unilateral act. 13 1 Based on this
criterion, unilateral exploratory drilling and the actual taking or the
making of attempts to take such resources were considered unlawful.
To the contrary, however, activities of an exploratory nature,
encompassing both prospecting and licensing for mineral resources,
could generally be undertaken in relation to disputed continental shelf
areas. 13 2 An important component informing the analysis of the
tribunal on this point was that the ICJ designated seismic work to be
of a transitory character in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf (interim
measures).'3 3 However, exploratory drilling and exploitation needed to
be treated as legally different from unilateral seismic testing according
to the tribunal, 13 4 with the former two acts resulting in a "perceived
change to the status quo." 13 5
Despite being the most elaborate pronunciation on the meaning of
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC, considerations produced in
Guyana v. Suriname, notwithstanding some assumptions to the
contrary,1 36 have proven not to be the definitive word on the matter of
what scope is reserved for unilateralism in relation to mineral
resources within disputed areas. The relevance of the specific
circumstances surrounding a disputed maritime area in setting the
scope for unilateralism is confirmed by the judgment of the Special
Chamber in Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire, coming to very different conclusions
1 37
compared to the tribunal in its award in Guyana v. Suriname.

129. Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, ¶ 465 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
130. Id. T 463.
131. Id. ¶ 469.
132. Id. ¶ 467.
133. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), Request for the
Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 3, ¶ 30 (Sept. 11).
134. Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. ¶ 479.
135. Id. ¶ 480.
136. Dominic Roughton, The Rights (and Wrongs) of Capture: InternationalLaw
and the Implications of the Guyana/Suriname Arbitration, 26 J. ENERGY & NAT.
RESOURCEs L. 374, 398 (2008) (discussing the meaning and effect of Articles 74(3) and
83(3) after the tribunal had rendered its award in Guyana v. Suriname); Sakamoto,
supra note 15, at 101-02 (saying the tribunal's award in Guyana v. Suriname makes it
clear that Articles 74(3) and 83(3) do not prohibit all unilateral acts in a disputed EEZ
or continental shelf area).
137. See Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between
Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cite dIvoire), Case No. 23,
Judgment of Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, TT 541-659; see also supra Part V.B.
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IV. THE FIRST PART OF THE PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN GHANA AND C(TE
D'IVOIRE: INTERIM MEASURES STAGE

Earlier in this Article, the positions of Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire,
and the handling of the arguments by the Special Chamber in the
phases on the merits and interim protection, have been laid out in
broad strokes. In turn, both these phases will be analyzed with a
special emphasis on those aspects bearing on the issue of acts of
unilateralism undertaken in disputed maritime areas concerning
mineral resources. Part IV will start with looking at the phase of the
interim measures, which was initiated by C6te d'Ivoire in February
2015 with its request for interim protection, then directing attention
in Part V to the dispute on the merits, on which the Special Chamber
delivered its final judgment in September 2017.
A. Cate d'Ivoire's Positionon Interim Measures
C6te d'Ivoire's stated reason for the request for interim protection
was that the exclusivity existing for the coastal state to act concerning
the continental shelf was infringed upon, predominantly basing its
position on Articles 2(2), 56(1), and 77(1) of the LOSC. 13 8 The
exclusivity enjoyed by C6te d'Ivoire enabled it to engage in acts related
to mineral resources that may have been found in the continental shelf,
to the exclusion of all other states. Under this logic, unilateral acts
having an economic character had to be fully abjured prior a final
delimitation. As a corollary thereto, C6te d'Ivoire's request was tailored
to halt activities already set in motion in the disputed area.1 3 9 In
addition, it sought measures of interim protection to the effect of
prohibiting future conduct-that is, that no new permits were awarded
or activated by Ghana in relation to the disputed maritime area prior
to final delimitation. 140 If Ghana was allowed to continue with
unilateral conduct related to mineral resources, C6te d'Ivoire's
sovereign rights would become threatened with irreparability.
Moreover, significant and irreparable harm to the marine environment
was inevitable to ensue. 1 4 1
Effects of this magnitude were argued to occur from the following
range of unilateral activities: conducting (marine scientific) research;
the concluding of contracts with the petroleum industry; the approval

138. See Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between
Ghana and C~te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cdte D'Ivoire), Case No. 23,
Provisional Measures, Order of Apr. 25, 2015, 15 ITLOS Rep. 146, ¶ 49.
139. See id. IT 50-56.
140. These were two of Cbte d'Ivoire's five submissions, that is (i) and (ii). See id.
¶ 25.
141. Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures Submitted by the
Republic of C6te dIvoire, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No.
23, Feb. 27, 2015, at 15-16.
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of seismic work; starting (exploratory or exploitation) drilling
operations; and bringing installations into position within a disputed
area. 14 2 Along these lines, C6te d'Ivoire, in its oral pleadings, sought
to demonstrate that the effects of drilling into the seabed for mineral
resources were such that the seabed could, by definition, not be
returned to its original state;1 4 3 rather, effects caused to the marine
environment would be permanent. According to Cbte d'Ivoire,
international law recognized that the following elements are
encompassed by a coastal state's sovereign rights: having information
in relation to mineral resources in terms of their amount, places where
they are located, and whether the in situ available quantities would be
suitable for commercial exploitation.1 4 4 If, in the final ruling the area
in question would be established to be on Cbte d'Ivoire's side of the
boundary, Ghana's possession of this information would cause
irreparable prejudice to C6te d'Ivoire's rights.
Paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC was invoked by C6te
d'Ivoire to further reinforce its position that its exclusiveness of rights
over the continental shelf needed to be preserved prior to delimitation.
C6te d'Ivoire took the position that the implication of paragraph 3 was
that a moratorium on economic conduct was automatically
introduced. 145 Lifting this moratorium was tied to states having
reached cooperative arrangements or a delimitation. Support for this
position was provided, according to C6te d'Ivoire, by the debates at the
Third Law of the Sea Conference. 1 4 6 Here during negotiations, a
number of states actively promoted the moratorium solution as the
applicable rule prior to delimitation, and in the absence of agreement
to the contrary between the states concerned.1 4 7 This interpretation is
problematic, however: an interim rule based on a moratorium was a
minority opinion at the Third Law of the Sea Conference, being held
only by a smaller group of states (e.g., Ireland and Papua New
Guinea).1 4 8 The gist of these proposals was virtually identical to the
argument of CMte d'Ivoire: if claimant states were unsuccessful in

142. Id. at 8.
143. Verbatim Record, Public Sitting, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te
d'Ivoire), Mar. 29, 2015, at 25.
144. Request for the Prescription of Provisional Measures Submitted by the
Republic of C6te d'Ivoire, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between Ghana and Cate d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No.
23, Feb. 27, 2015, at 17.
145. Id. at 10.
146. See Counter-Memorial, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cate d'Ivoire),
Case No. 23, Apr. 4, 2016, at 236-37.
147. See Van Logchem Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 180 (discussing Ireland's
introduction of the concept of a moratorium as the applicable interim rule seeking to
govern the conduct of States pending continental shelf delimitation, but saying it was
not discussed much).
148. See, e.g., Platzoder, supra note 81, at 406.

2019]

DISPUTED MARITIME AREAS

145

setting up cooperative arrangements, a moratorium on economic
conduct would be introduced. Aside from being limited in number,
proposals advocating a ban on all economic activities were met with a
great measure of skepticism from other states because of their
14 9
economic consequences.
It is of note that C6te d'Ivoire's reasoning on the point of a
moratorium being introduced as an interim rule seems to have not
been entirely consistent. In its oral pleadings, C6te d'Ivoire argued that
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC does not imply that no room
exists for economic conduct within a disputed maritime area; however,
this position was turned on its head in the merits phase. 15 0 Overall,
the de facto effect of the position of C6te d'Ivoire was seeking to return
the disputed maritime area to a state where Ghana had not acted
unilaterally and unlawfully in relation to mineral resources, which it
15 1
deemed to be the relevant status quo.
B. Ghana'sPosition on Interim Measures
Much of Ghana's argumentation, designed around justifying it
moving to the phase of exploitation, was tied to C6te d'Ivoire acquiesing
to the conduct of Ghana by never protesting. In its pleadings, Ghana
invoked a range of examples in support of its contention of
acquiescence: the alignment of concessions given by the two states
concerned, and that drilling and seismic operations had only
commenced on their respective sides of the equidistance boundary
line. 152 The evidence invoked by Ghana to strengthen its argument
consisted, inter alia, of it allowing the petroleum industry to proceed
with work by using the equidistance boundary line as the appropriate
rule of thumb for acceding or denying requests from the industry.
Further, and this functioned as the linchpin of Ghana's argument, all
3
this happened without the protest of C~te d'Ivoire. 15 Ghana continued
by trying to demonstrate, through significant detail, that its own
practice of respecting the equidistance boundary was mirrored by the
licensing practice of C6te d'Ivoire: the latter was restrained similarly

149. See, e.g., id. at 430.
150. Verbatim Record, Public Sitting, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C~te
dIvoire), Mar. 29, 2015, at 16.
151. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and Cate d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Provisional
Measures, Order of Apr. 25, 2015, 15 ITLOS Rep. 146, ¶ 25.
152. Written Statement of Ghana, Request for the Prescription of Provisional
Measures Submitted by the Republic of C6te d'Ivoire, Dispute Concerning Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean
(Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Mar. 23, 2015, at 1, 5-6.
153. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and CSte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, ¶ 113.
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because the reach of its concluded contracts with the petroleum
industry never crossed this equidistance line. 15 4
A second strand of argument presented by Ghana was that the
request for the indication of measures of interim protection could not
succeed because CMte d'Ivoire did not intend to keep its disputed
maritime area in pristine condition. 1 55 The discovery of oil and gas
fields in "the territory of CMte d'Ivoire" would result in the roles of the
two states being reversed, in that Ghana would have found itself on
the outside looking in. 1 5 6 CMte d'Ivoire, with a similar zest, would have
undertaken acts in connection with the mineral resources in the
disputed area. According to Ghana, C6te d'Ivoire's attempt to draw a
parallel with previous case law (i.e., Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(interim measures) or Guyana v. Suriname) to bolster its argument
that Ghana's unilateral acts were unlawful, was misplaced.1 5 7 This
was because the facts existing between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire stood
in stark contrast to these two previously mentioned cases, where there
had been no "exploration or development" by either state.15 8 A
fundamental difference was that Suriname contested the lawfulness of
all exploratory drilling within the disputed area, and Greece argued
that no seismic work could be undertaken in relation to the disputed
continental shelf area. 15 9 Rather, according to Ghana, what was at the
core of its dispute with Cbte d'Ivoire, and inspiring the tone of the
latter's argumentation, was CMte d'Ivoire feeling entitled to enjoy the
economic benefits that could be reaped from developing the mineral
16 0
resources located in the disputed continental shelf area.
Another ground invoked by Ghana against having to put all its
exploration and exploitation efforts on hold for the duration of the
dispute over the maritime boundary being settled was the economic
implications that would have followed therefrom. Ghana considered
these implications to be close to catastrophic, as investments that were
made at the time already exceeded USD$4.5 billion. 161 To order Ghana
to put a stop to the work would lead to investors withdrawing from
their earlier commitments, dealing "a crippling blow" 1 62 to Ghana's

154. Written Statement of Ghana, Request for the Prescription of Provisional
Measures Submitted by the Republic of C6te d'Ivoire, Dispute Concerning Delimitation
of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean
(Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Mar. 23, 2015, at 8-19.
155. Id. at 47-48.
156. Id.
157. See id. ("[Guyanav. Suriname] is in clear contrast to the present case, where
such activities have proceeded for many years, with the knowledge and acquiescence of
C6te d'Ivoire.").
158. Id. at 48.
159. Id. at 47-48.
160. Id. at 48 ("[T]he questions is purely that of economic entitlement to the
economic benefits flowing from those activities.").
161. Id. at 5.
162. Id. at 25.
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economy-in fact, it would regress to a low point it had not been at for
several decades. 1 63 Investors withdrawing were not the only negative
consequence that followed from putting a stop to Ghana's activities:
infrastructure already being moved into the disputed area to start with
the production of mineral resources, after falling into disuse, would
also begin to deteriorate. 16 4 Ghana, in tailoring its argument to
whether the requirement of urgency was fulfilled, being one of the
necessary requirements for an international court or tribunal to offer
interim protection, argued that the fact that it was able to progress to
16 5
the stage of exploitation exemplified the lack of urgency thereof.
Besides a lack of urgency, the requirement of irreparability was also
not met. Damages claimed to be incurred by C6te d'Ivoire lacked the
element of irreparability, as they could be remedied through awarding
damages ex post facto. 166 Under its argument, Ghana did not
distinguish between the different types of acts it undertook concerning
mineral resources in terms of their reparability. 16 7 No matter whether
these acts were exploration or exploitation related, all of them could be
compensated after delimitation with seemingly equal ease.

C. The Order of the Special Chamber of ITLOS
On April 25, 2015, the Special Chamber delivered its ruling on the
question of whether interim measures of protection could be indicated,
per the request of C6te d'Ivoire. 16 8 Despite C6te d'Ivoire's reliance on
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC in its request for interim
protection, and that Ghana referred to this paragraph as well, no
mention of this provision can be found in the order of the Special
Chamber. 1 69
According to the Chamber, two elementary requirements needed
to be present in order for it to be able to accede to a request for interim
protection: (1) a recognized urgency and (2) a real and imminent threat
of irreparable prejudice to rights.1 70 Here, the Chamber seems to have
followed the line of argument that had been, inter alia, set out earlier
by the ICJ in its ruling in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina

163. Id. at 25, 27-29.
164. Id. at 26-27.
165. Id. at 43-44.
166. Id. at 45.
167. Id.
168. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, T 16.
169. It has been suggested that the reason for this is that the members of the
Special Chamber operated on the belief that paragraph 3 of Articles 74 and 83 of the
LOSC carries no relevance in an interim measures procedure. See BIILC REPORT, supra
note 5, at 26.
170. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and C~te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cate dIvoire), Case No. 23, Provisional
Measures, Order of Apr. 25, 2015, 15 ITLOS Rep. 146, T 42.
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v. Uruguay) (ProvisionalMeasures) (Pulp Mills case), indicating that
the ordering of interim measures of protection is inexorably interwoven
with the presence of an urgent necessity to prevent irreparable
prejudice to the rights in dispute before the Court is able to give its
final ruling on the matter. 1 7 1 On the question of whether, in the case
at hand, the thresholds of irreparability and urgency were surpassed,
the Special Chamber gave a mixed answer. Gathering information and
undertaking unilateral exploration and exploitation activities in
connection with the disputed area were recognized by the Chamber to
pose a threat of irreparability:1 72 to paraphrase, this unilateral
conduct caused a "risk of irreversible prejudice" to C6te d'Ivoire's
rights.' 7 3
What is especially interesting about this part of the order is that
the Chamber established a relationship that was hitherto not explicitly
recognized to exist in the international case law: gathering information
on a disputed continental shelf area, and putting it to use-being an
act that does not alter the geography of the continental shelf-may
possibly lead to irreparability being caused to another state's rights.
Among the rights a coastal state has over the continental shelf, and
which might be irreparably infringed upon, is plausibly to obtain
information and to put it to use exclusively and in a way of its own
design1 7 4 (i.e., a right to information was acknowledged to exist by the
Chamber).
Notwithstanding the Special Chamber's finding that a "risk" of
irreparability was caused by the unilateral acts of Ghana, this did not
automatically imply that the required urgency was present,
constituting a second hurdle that had to be overcome for an
international court or tribunal to be able to institute interim measures
of protection. Subsequently, the Chamber addressed when this
consideration would enter into play: manifestation of this risk was tied
to a showing that the area in which the unilateral seismic work took
1 75
place was considered to be under the jurisdiction of Cate d'Ivoire.
Hence, the Chamber identified two respective stages (i.e., before
and after delimitation) showing significant similarity to the way in
which the ICJ construed its analysis in Aegean Sea Continental Shelf
(interim measures). Exploration activities that were undertaken by
Turkey in connection with a disputed continental shelf area carried, in
the view of the ICJ, the inherent possibility of causing prejudice. 17 6
However, this risk coming to fruition was entwined with the

171. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Provisional Measures Order,
2007 I.C.J. Rep. 3, T 32 (Jan. 23).
172. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Provisional Measures), 15 ITLOS Rep. TT 95-96.
173. Id. ¶¶ 94-95.
174. Id. ¶ 94.
175. Id. 1 95.
176. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turk.), Request for the
Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 3, 1¶ 30-31 (Sept.
11).
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consideration of the area ultimately being considered to be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of Greece after the delimitation was established
by the ICJ. In terms of this risk arising, the Special Chamber in
Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire reached a rather similar conclusion.
However, at variance with the ICJ in Aegean Sea Continental
Shelf (interim measures), the Chamber stated that damages incurred
from producing mineral resources could be compensated by financial
means ex post facto. In this regard, the Chamber considered only the
relative ease with which unilateral exploitation could be compensated,
implying that in relation to exploration activities (e.g., exploratory
drilling and seismic work) this exercise of calculating the extent of
damages will be more complicated.1 7 7 At face value, it does indeed
seem more difficult to calculate the damage caused through unlawful
drilling and seismic work. For example, how can the obtaining of an
advantage by one claimant over another in terms of the information it
possess through conducting seismic work or exploratory drilling be
compensated? The Special Chamber did not further elaborate on how
these relevant differences in connection with certain types of unilateral
mineral resource activity interacted with calculating the height of
compensation.
However, away from the question of compensation, the Chamber
recognized another side to Ghana's exploration and exploitation
activities undertaken in the disputed area: that is, the continental
shelf was invariably modified as a result. Some of these physical
modifications to the continental shelf cannot be remedied through
financial compensation ex post facto according to the Special
Chamber.1 7 8 What was clear, however, is that compensation does not
enable restoring the physical characteristics of the continental shelf to
its original form (i.e., to the state prior to the unilateral act being
undertaken).' 7 9
It was not decisive for the Chamber that a particular unilateral
act carried the potential for causing damage of an irremediable nature,
as indicated earlier. Rather, the unlawfulness of a unilateral act was
tied to the areas concerned being considered to be under the exclusive
jurisdiction of Cbte d'Ivoire after delimitation. After emphasizing that
it could give individual measures of interim protection different, in
whole or in part, from those requested by the parties to a dispute, the
Chamber addressed the ramifications of ordering Ghana to put a halt
to its previously initiated conduct in relation to mineral resources in
the disputed area.1 80 According to the Chamber, ordering Ghana to
abort work had two consequences that predominantly argued against
this, one of which was underlain by perceived financial ramifications;
and the other concerned the marine environment being detrimentally

177. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Provisional Measures), 15 ITLOS Rep.
178. Id. ¶ 89.
179. Id. ¶ 90.
180. Id. TT 97-100.
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affected.1 8 1 More specifically, what formed a serious threat to the
marine environment was putting the infrastructure out of commission,
which would invariably set in motion the deterioration process.
However, the Special Chamber did not elaborate on why in the
balance of things this particular environmental concern trumped the
other environmental impacts caused by Ghana's exploration and
exploitation activities in the disputed area. Furthermore, the financial
losses suffered by Ghana, and those being concessioned by it, would
impose an "undue burden" on the state. 18 2 In balancing the
aforementioned two considerations with the aspect of preserving the
rights claimed by C6te d'Ivoire, particularly their exclusive character,
the Chamber drew the line at drilling new wells, allowing previous
drilling operations to continue unaffected. 1 8 3 Ghana, in addition, had
to make sure that information previously gathered, or that would be
collected on future occasions from drilling, would not be used in a way
that could come "to the detriment of C6te d'Ivoire" if the areas were
conclusively considered to be under its jurisdiction after
delimitation. 184

V. THE SECOND PART OF THE

PROCEEDINGS BETWEEN GHANA AND

COTE

D'IVOIRE: MERITS STAGE

During the merits phase, Ghana repeated many of its previously
presented arguments focusing on the silence observed by C6te d'Ivoire
for over four decades, resulting in acquiescence. 18 5 C6te d'Ivoire
disputed that there was acquiescence on its part, as evinced by its
various protests. 18 6 Two main reasons were invoked by C6te d'Ivoire
to argue that the unilateral acts of Ghana were unlawful: the
exclusivity of the sovereign rights C6te d'Ivoire claimed to have was
infringed upon; and Ghana's unilateral conduct exerted a separate
effect of hampering and jeopardizing delimitation.

A. C6te d'Ivoire's Contentions
According to C6te d'Ivoire, it became clear in the twentieth
century that there was a maritime boundary dispute between itself and
Ghana. Particularly relevant in this regard were two events occurring

181. Id. ¶ 99.
182. Id. ¶ 100.
183. Id. ¶ 102.
184. Id. ¶108(1)(b).
185. See, e.g., Reply of Ghana, Volume I, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cate
d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, July 25, 2016, at 4, 137-38.
186. Counter-Memorial, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire),
Case No. 23, Apr. 4, 2016, at 117-20.
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in 1988 and 1992, during which Cbte d'Ivoire sought to force Ghana to
postpone its unilateral activities by protesting.1 8 7 This made it
abundantly clear, according to Cbte d'Ivoire, that it never recognized
the outer point of Ghana's earlier given concessions (i.e., not crossing
the equidistance line) as the location where the maritime boundary
lay.1 8 8
After reviewing the relevant case law, C6te d'Ivoire concluded that
the standard as to when tacit agreement can be assumed to exist was
set very high by international courts and tribunals, whenever they
were faced with such claims. 1 89 A mere alignment in the scope of
awarded concessions would be insufficient in meeting this
threshold.19 0 Contrary to the picture sketched by Ghana, claiming that
its activities had been continuously ongoing over decades, reality
according to Cdte d'Ivoire was different. Two aspects illustrated this.
First, the majority of Ghana's drilling operations were concentrated in
the period between 2009 and 2014; and, second, Ghana speeding up its
unilateral activities was tied to receiving promising results as to the
commercial viability of certain oil and gas fields located in the disputed
area. 19 1 The protests made by C6te d'Ivoire did not deter Ghana from
increasing its level of activity, however.
In support of its contention that Ghana breached paragraphs 1
and 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC, C6te d'Ivoire invoked three
considerations. First, the unilateral acts undertaken by Ghana in the
disputed area exerted an effect of hampering or jeopardizing; second,
Ghana's uncompromising stance in negotiations was contrary to both
paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC; and, third, Ghana's
historical unwillingness to have the matter adjudicated by an
international court or tribunal breached these two paragraphs.1 92
In its counter-memorial, Cbte d'Ivoire analyzed the meaning of
Article 83 of the LOSC in a wider sense. It began by pointing out that
Ghana's unilateral conduct resulted in a breach of an obligation
flowing from paragraph 1 of Article 83 of the LOSC: through
undertaking acts unilaterally, Ghana had abandoned all willingness to
negotiate in good faith on settling the maritime boundary dispute.' 9 3

187. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and Cate d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, 1 174.
188. Id. TT 103, 105.
189. See id. ¶ 122 ("C6te d'Ivoire argues that an analysis of the documents
produced by Ghana relating to the line for oil concessions does not demonstrate the
existence of a tacit agreement on a maritime boundary in accordance with the high
standard required by jurisprudence.").
190. Id.
191. Id. ¶ 134.
192. Id. ¶ 598-600, 606.
193. Counter-Memorial, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and Cate d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cate d'Ivoire),
Case No. 23, Apr. 4, 2016, at 235.
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In elaborating further on how paragraph 1 of Article 83 of the LOSC
was breached, C6te d'Ivoire pointed to Ghana's behavior being
synonymous with the latter seeking to effect a maritime boundary
through creating a fait accompli, rather than through agreement as
paragraph 1 explicitly requires.1 9 4 C6te d'Ivoire argued that the
importance of the obligation to hold good faith negotiations had been
enhanced in light of the fact that the oil and gas fields located in the
disputed area could be considered a "shared deposit."1 9 5
C6te d'Ivoire built the majority of its argumentation on the point
of the unlawfulness of the unilateral activities around paragraph 3,
predominantly the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize delimitation
of the continental shelf. The origins of the obligation to negotiate
towards a provisional arrangement, and it becoming a constituent part
of paragraph 3, were traced back to the division that pervaded during
the Third Law of the Sea Conference over the extent to which
limitations had to be imposed on the scope of unilateral economic
conduct within a disputed area. 19 6 Determining where the continental
shelf boundary lay between the coasts of Ghana and CMte d'Ivoire was,
according to the latter, complicated by the unilateral mineral resource
activity of Ghana.' 9 7 One of the aspects that enhanced the difficulties
encountered in this regard was the scale on which Ghana undertook
unilateral acts in relation to the disputed continental shelf area. The
chosen strategy of C6te d'Ivoire revolved around an attempt to show
that refraining from unilateral economic conduct in a disputed
maritime area is mandated pursuant to international law-"les
activitis 6conomiques unilatrales sont prohibdes dans une zone
litigieuse."'9 8 Its argument on this point, falling effectively along two
lines, will be explored in turn over the next two paragraphs.
Combining the gist of paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC,
particularly its negotiating history, with the exclusivity of sovereign
rights of the coastal states, the following could be concluded according
to CMte d'Ivoire: unilateral economic conduct had to be completely
eschewed prior to continental shelf delimitation. 1 99 In an attempt to
reinforce its argument, CMte d'Ivoire relied heavily on one particular
holding set out in Guyana v. Suriname, in which the tribunal held that
activities brought under the reach of a provisional arrangement could
be undertaken pending delimitation. 20 0 Isolated from its context, this
holding can perhaps be interpreted to mean that concluding a

194. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶ 600.
195. Id.
196. Counter-Memorial, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire),
Case No. 23, Apr. 4, 2016, at 236-37 (citing Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3,
at 193).
197. Id. at 241-42.
198. Id. at 237.
199. Id.
200. Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, T 465 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
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provisional arrangement precludes the possibility of undertaking
unilateral conduct within a disputed maritime area. However, when
read in conjunction with other holdings of the tribunal, the force of this
presented argument ebbs away quickly. This is because in these other
holdings, the tribunal rather emphasized that some room must be
reserved for unilateral conduct in connection with mineral
resources. 2 0 1 Furthermore, it went on to draw a divisional line between
different categories of unilateral activity, placing some economic
activities in the permissible category, and placing others in the
impermissible one, undercutting CMte d'Ivoire's reading of Guyana v.
Suriname further. 2 02
In addition, CMte d'Ivoire carefully detailed its argument that the
principle of exclusivity would entail that no economic activities can
commence prior to delimitation. Under international law, the coastal
state (i.e., CMte d'Ivoire) enjoys exclusive use over the adjacent
continental shelf and the mineral resources contained therein, as is
reaffirmed in Articles 77 and 81 of the LOSC. 2 03 Breaches were made
on this exclusivity of the sovereign rights of CMte d'Ivoire, through the
full range of unilateral activities concerning mineral resources
undertaken by Ghana. Two detrimental effects are exerted by
unilateral seismic work according to CMte d'Ivoire, making it unlawful:
first, it is a "source of serious tension" between the states concerned;
and, second, vital information on the resources of the seabed will be
provided and be placed at the exclusive disposal of that state, offering
it considerable advantages in, for example, negotiations with the
petroleum industry, or in (delimitation) negotiations with the other
2 04
claimant state that has not acquired the same information.
The history of effected maritime boundary delimitations laid bare
a recurrent pattern in the view of C6te d'Ivoire: 2 0 5 once "invasive
activities" were undertaken unilaterally within the disputed maritime
area and prompted a protest from the other claimant, subsequently,
acts of this nature were eschewed pending delimitation. 2 0 6 Despite
CMte d'Ivoire's protests, and it requesting Ghana to put all its
unilateral conduct on hold on account of paragraph 3 of Article 83 of
the LOSC, Ghana acted at variance with this detected pattern. This is
seen in that instead of abandoning its practice of acting unilaterally

201. See id. TT 465-70 (saying unilateral acts that do not jeopardize or hamper
reaching a delimitation agreement, such as those that do not cause physical change to
the marine environment, are permissible).
202. Id. ¶¶ 466, 467.
203. Counter-Memorial, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire),
Case No. 23, Apr. 4, 2016, at 221-22.
204. Id. at 237.
205. Id. at 238-39.
206. See also Verbatim Record, Public Sitting, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of
the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and Cate d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean
(Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Mar. 29, 2015, at 17-18.
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concerning the disputed maritime area, as would have been the
required response from the view of international law, Ghana decided
to amplify the intensity with which it started to act unilaterally.
B. Ghana's Contentions
One of Ghana's main contentions was that there was silence on
the part of C6te d'Ivoire, amounting to a de facto maritime boundary
lying between their coasts. Evidence of this came particularly in the
shape of its "oil practice," the provenance of which goes back to 1956.207
The range of acts undertaken by Ghana in connection with the
disputed area, which consistently failed to produce any kind of
response from C6te d'Ivoire, consisted of the following: entertaining
applications from the petroleum industry, giving concessions, seismic
209
surveying, 2 0 8 and exploratory drilling.
According to Ghana, acceptance of the equidistance boundary line
started in 1957, with C6te d'Ivoire awarding a concession by using this
same line as the outer limit; had more extensive areas been covered
within its reach, an overlap would have formed with a concession given
a year earlier by Ghana. 2 10 To avoid such an overlap was, according to
Ghana, the driving force behind C6te d'Ivoire restricting the reach of
its given concessions to the equidistance line. 2 1 1 Since then, and
despite broader areas becoming covered under awarded concessions,
albeit that their precise area of application underwent some changes,
a consistent pattern was argued by Ghana to have emerged: both
parties to the dispute observed the equidistance boundary line in their
licensing policies. 2 12 Drilling by CMte d'Ivoire on its own side of the
equidistance line had in fact been extensive, with no less than 212
wells being drilled; but these never extended west of the equidistance
line, thus crossing into areas which Ghana regarded to be under its
exclusive jurisdiction. 2 13 The accusations being directed by C6te
d'Ivoire at Ghana for encroaching on the dispute area were underlain
according to the latter by a fundamental misconception: Ghana had not
undertaken unilateral acts in relation to mineral resources located in
a "disputed area." Because of C6te d'Ivoire's acquiescence, 2 14 Ghana's
unilateral conduct on its own side of the equidistance boundary line

207. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, ¶ 113, 116.
208. Id. TT 124-29.
209. Id. TT 104-05, 113, 130-36.
210. Id. ¶ 116.
211. Id. ¶ 117.
212. Id.
213. Id. T 132.
214. Reply of Ghana, Volume I, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and C8te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire),
Case No. 23, July 25, 2016, at 137.
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constituted an area under its exclusive jurisdiction. This made Cbte
d'Ivoire's portrayal of these activities as being "unilateral" in nature,
2 15
and occurring in a disputed maritime area, a misnomer.
At the center of Ghana's argument was that a de facto boundary
had evolved, but despite this main emphasis, Ghana did put forward
an alternative line of argument based on paragraph 3 of Article 83 of
the LOSC. The quite heavy reliance of Cite d'Ivoire on this paragraph
made it seemingly necessary for Ghana to address the meaning of
paragraph 3. C6te d'Ivoire's reading of paragraph 3, coming down to
introducing a moratorium on economic conduct in a disputed area, had,
in the view of Ghana, no basis in the case law, literature, or negotiating
history; in fact, these uniformly laid out a view opposite to the one
sketched by C6te d'Ivoire. 2 16 When paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the
LOSC is analyzed in its entirety, this argument is reinforced further:
not only is there an obligation mandating states to abstain from
undertaking certain types of acts unilaterally, but in addition, there is
an obligation imported on states to seek provisional arrangements;
however, the latter does not imply an actual obligation to successfully
set up cooperative arrangements. 2 17 Another strong presumption
against the solution of the moratorium can be derived from the dispute
between Guyana and Suriname. In Guyana v. Suriname, the tribunal
placed great emphasis on avoiding the introduction of a
moratorium: 2 1 8 the economic implications that follow from bringing a
disputed maritime area under the reach of a moratorium argued
against this. And, as was pointed out by Ghana, C6te d'Ivoire
conveniently ignored that the tribunal drew a dividing line between
permissible and impermissible unilateral economic uses of a disputed
19
maritime area. 2
C. The Special Chamber'sPronouncement on the Merits
Ghana's primary contention was that a de facto maritime
22 0
Whether this
boundary had developed through acquiescence.
contention was supported by the Chamber will be addressed in the next
subpart. Besides delimitation, there were several other "subsidiary"
aspects to the judgment of the Special Chamber that merit further
consideration. Two of these aspects were: (1) had, as Ghana argued,
C6te d'Ivoire's silence amounted to acquiescence; and (2) were
paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC breached by Ghana
through it undertaking a wide range of unilateral acts concerning

215. Id.
216. Id. at 150 (citing Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at 180-81).
217. Id. at 150.
218. Id. at 151.
219. Id.
220. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, ¶¶ 104-05, 113, 116, 124-36.
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mineral resources? Whether paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC or
Cate d'Ivoire's sovereign rights were infringed upon through Ghana's
acts of unilateralism, and whether international responsibility could
be incurred for this, were matters of a more subsidiary nature. This
was illustrated by the fact that the Special Chamber's handling of
these issues formed a more minor part of the judgment.
1. Acquiescence in the Maritime Boundary?
Starting its analysis on the point of whether there was
acquiescence in the maritime boundary, as alleged by Ghana, 2 2 1 the
Special Chamber recognized that concessions awarded by the two
states aligned. 2 22 Connected to this, operations undertaken in
connection with mineral resources, being seismic surveying and
drilling, similarly did not cross this boundary. After acknowledging
that neither party to the dispute crossed into areas lying on the other
side of the equidistance boundary, the Special Chamber, however,
rejected Ghana's argument centering on the existence of a de facto
maritime boundary. 2 23 The Chamber in Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire, falling
back on Nicaragua v. Honduras, in which the ICJ indicated that
because of their gravity, maritime boundaries cannot be easily
assumed to exist through acquiescence, held that evidence thereof
must be "compelling." 2 2 4
Next, the Chamber addressed why the threshold of compelling
evidence was not met by Ghana. One problematic aspect with Ghana's
position was that most of the evidence centered on the existence of a
consistent oil practice. 2 2 5 In finding that the evidence presented by
Ghana relating to this oil practice did not bear out the existence of a
pre-existing boundary, falling short of being compelling, there were
three aspects to the Special Chamber's denial on this point. First,
although the record was patchy, in that Cbte d'Ivoire protested
irregularly and with varying intensity, it did protest on more than one
occasion against Ghana's unilateral conduct concerning mineral
resources, so much was clear. 2 2 6 Second, the Special Chamber
entertained significant doubts whether a de facto maritime boundary,
which was argued to encompass more than the seabed alone, could be
shown to exist by relying solely on evidence pertaining to activities
conducted in connection with the latter. 2 2 7 Third, in terms of

221. Id. TT 100, 102.
222. Id. ¶ 146.
223. Id. ¶ 228.
224. Id. ¶¶ 199, 212.
225. Id. TT 146, 226.
226. Id. 1 214.
227. In Peru v. Chile, the ICJ stated that in determining the extent of a single
maritime boundary, a consistent practice concerning fisheries was not deemed decisive
either. See Case Concerning Maritime Dispute (Peru v. Chile), Judgment, 2014 I.C.J.
Rep. 3, T 111 (Jan. 27). Furthermore, another difficulty arises from interpreting an oil
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geographical reach, the activities of Ghana were restricted to areas
falling within the two hundred nm limit, putting into question what
evidential weight such acts carry in proving the de facto existence of a
maritime boundary also extending beyond two hundred nm. 2 2 8
2. The Maritime Boundary Established by the Chamber
In regard to the primary issue in dispute, that of where the
boundary lay between the two states, the Special Chamber plotted a
maritime boundary for the territorial sea, EEZ, and continental shelf,
also beyond two hundred nm, following largely a line that is
equidistant from the adjacent coasts of the states concerned. The
boundary, beginning at the point where the land boundary terminates,
from that point onwards is more or less a straight boundary line (i.e.,
an unaltered equidistance line) extending up to a point beyond the two
hundred nm limit. 22 9

Those parts of the disputed area where Ghana had given
concessions pursuant to which Tullow Oil was on the verge of
exploitation were all considered to be under Ghana's exclusive
jurisdiction. After the final ruling was delivered, Tullow Oil, by
2 30
publishing a statement on its website, applauded the result,
indicating that work would be resumed shortly. A consequence of the
judgment of the Special Chamber is that the reach of certain previously
issued concessions by both parties to the dispute would have to be
revisited, as some of the blocks they issued straddle the newly
established maritime boundary.2 3 1 But, importantly, this did not

practice that is seemingly consistent: having the reach of concessions not extend beyond
a certain line may be borne out by reasons different from recognition of a maritime
boundary by a state. Restraint, or caution being exercised, by the parties to the dispute
can be alternative motivations for having a concession not extend beyond a geographical
point. Ghana/C~te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶¶ 215, 226.
228. Ghana's proclaimed legislation carried little weight, according to the
Chamber, in assessing whether there was acquiescence on the part of Cdte d'Ivoire;
Ghana's legislation, in fact, did not make it clear that there was such pre-existing
agreement. The submissions made by the two states to the Commission on the Limits of
the Continental Shelf to assess the extent of their extended continental shelf
entitlements held no value either in regard of the acquiescence contention. These
submissions, containing an explicit disclaimer, in which they were excluded from
affecting the underlying issue of maritime boundary delimitation, was for the Chamber
sufficient reason to deny them any relevance in relation to assessing whether a de facto
boundary existed. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶¶ 109, 163, 168, 219,
224.
229. Id. ¶ 540.
2017),
23,
(Sept.
OIL
TULLOW
judgment,
230. ITLOS
[https://perma.cc/84G3http://www.tullowoil.com/medialpress-releases/itlos-judgment
386H] (archived Nov. 7, 2018).
231. See Pieter Bekker & Robert van de Poll, Ghana and CMte d'Ivoire Receive a
13,
2017,
Oct.
INSIGHTS,
21
ASIL
Strict-Equidistance Boundary,
https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/21/issue/11/ghana-and-cote-divoire-receive-strictequidistance-boundary [https://perma.cc/6CZ6-JVFZ] (archived Nov. 7, 2018).
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concern areas in relation to which Ghana had begun exploration and
exploitation activities. 2 3 2
3. A Judgment on Delimitation: Constitutive or Declarative of Rights?
It is of note that on the issue of "the meaning of a judgment on the
delimitation of the continental shelf," 2 33 the Chamber took a position
at variance with those of the states involved. Where the parties to the
dispute agreed that delimitation is of a declarativenature, although
their views differed in relation to the consequences that followed from
delimitation being declarative, the Chamber defined the nature of
delimitation as consisting of both declarative and constitutive
elements. 2 34 Not only was this at variance with the positions of the
states concerned, this is also at odds with previously rendered
international case law. Looking at, for example, the North Sea
Continental Shelf cases, the ICJ stated that delimitation is of a
declarative nature: the undelimited continental shelf already belongs
to the coastal state, meaning delimitation is not concerned with "the
determination de novo of such an area." 2 3 5 Closely connected to this
finding of the ICJ was the consideration that the sovereign rights the
coastal state has over the continental shelf are inherent and flow
automatically from the state having sovereignty over territory. 23 6
Following on these lines set out by the ICJ, Cbte d'Ivoire took the
position that the aspect of exclusivity of sovereign rights is not
dependent on when the maritime boundary is established.2 3 7
Rights of the coastal state to the continental shelf, being inherent
and ab initio, would inevitably require a judgment of the Chamber to
be declarative of these rights, in the view of CMte d'Ivoire. Under this
logic, the rights a coastal state has over the continental shelf already
exist, and so does their exclusiveness, also in relation to the disputed
parts of a continental shelf. Through delimitation, the geographical
extent of these rights is determined conclusively, subsequently opening
up the possibility for states to act exclusively on these rights in relation
to mineral resources in areas on its own side of the boundary.
Inevitably, however, by allowing acts to proceed unilaterally in relation
to the disputed continental shelf area, the aspect of exclusivity of a
state's rights would be breached. 23 8

232. Id.
233. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. 1 590.
234. Id. ¶ 591.
235. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/ Denmark;
Federal Republic Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, T 18 (Feb. 20).
236. Id. ¶ 19.
237. Counter-Memorial, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and Cate d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cbte dIvoire),
Case No. 23, Apr. 4, 2016, at 222.
238. See supra Part V.A.
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Against the backdrop of Cbte d'Ivoire's contention that there is a
general requirement of not conducting unilateral activities in a
disputed maritime area, 2 39 because the sovereign rights it enjoyed
were exclusive in nature, Ghana contested the understanding that a
delimitation is declarative in the way suggested by C6te d'Ivoire. 2 40 In
general, Ghana agreed that delimitation is necessarily declarative in
24 1
nature; otherwise, the disputed area would be a terra nullius.
Although the states concerned were in agreement on delimitation
being declarative of rights, this did not imply that C6te d'Ivoire was
correct in arguing that its sovereign rights had been violated: "Ghana's
operations over many decades in the now-disputed area" could not be
2 42
Neither did
considered breaches of these rights, according to Ghana.
the consequence of the ab initio and ipso facto character of sovereign
rights over a continental shelf change this: "belatedly declaring" rights
over the disputed area did not have a consequential effect such that
previous lawfully undertaken conduct would now breach the sovereign
rights of CMte d'Ivoire, even after the latter altered the extent of its
claim to maritime zones. 24 3 So, Ghana placed great emphasis on the
argument that the acts it undertook related to an area that was not in
dispute, tying in to its acquiescence accusation. 2 44 Importantly,
however, it did not dispute the aspect of exclusivity already attaching
to a state's sovereign rights. Rather, Ghana argued that C6te d'Ivoire
could not claim having such exclusivity, having forfeited its sovereign
rights to areas falling on Ghana's side of the equidistance boundary
2 45
due to acquiescence.
The Chamber began its analysis with indicating where its view
converged with those of the parties to the dispute, that is: the sovereign
rights coastal states have over the continental shelf are exclusive and
exist ab initio.2 46 The Chamber went on to recognize that the states
concerned held similar views over the declarative nature of
delimitation. 2 4 7 However, characterizing delimitation as inherently
declarative was false according to the Chamber, stating that
248
but rather
delimitation "cannot be qualified as merely declarative,"
also possesses constitutive elements. Usually, these rights are

239. See supra Parts IV.A & V.A.
240. Reply of Ghana, Volume I, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C8te d'Ivoire),
Case No. 23, July 25, 2016, at 139-40.
241. Id. at 140.
242. Id.
243. Id. at 140-41.
244. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te dIvoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, T 581; see supra Part V.B.
245. See Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶ 581.
246. Id. ¶ 590.
247. Id. ¶ 585.
248. Id. T 591.
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considered to have an existence independent of delimitation, in that
these rights also apply to a disputed part of the continental shelf.2 49 In
this light, if another claimant holding a similar entitlement decides to
act unilaterally on related rights prior to delimitation, the pre-existing
rights of the other coastal state might be breached. However, the
Chamber did not go along these lines of argument, stating that
international law will only be breached by a state acting unilaterally
in a disputed maritime area that lacks a good faith claim to the area
concerned, as will be discussed in the next subpart.
Following the Chamber's finding that the continental shelf rights
of coastal states are exclusive, and that the entitlement to a continental
shelf is automatic, the Chamber discussed the issue of the nature of
the judgment on the delimitation it was called upon to effect. A
delimitation determines conclusively which parts of a disputed
continental shelf area belong to which state, coming down to it giving
preference to one state's entitlement over another.
Then, in light of assigning to delimitation both declarative and
constitutive aspects, the Special Chamber assessed whether a claimant
acting unilaterally in a disputed continental shelf area can incur
international responsibility, as this Article will later discuss.
So, the reasoning of the Special Chamber challenges what seems
to have been a widely held overall assumption: delimitation is
declarative of pre-existing rights. 250 In fact, the roots of the rather
unconvincing reasoning of the Chamber that unfolds on the issue of
international responsibility, as will be discussed next, can be retraced
to this characterization of the nature of delimitation.
4. Were Paragraphs 1 and 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC Breached by
Ghana?
In substantiating its argument that Ghana violated international
law through its unilateral actions, C~te d'Ivoire invoked both
paragraph 1 and paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC. 2 5 1 The Special
Chamber in its analysis addressed whether any breaches of these
paragraphs had occurred.
It started with answering the question of whether the claimed
violation by C6te d'Ivoire of the obligation to negotiate in good faith, as
was argued to be enshrined in paragraph 1 of Article 83 of the LOSC,
could be upheld. The Chamber began by recognizing that there is a
close tie between negotiations and delimitation, in that the former
necessarily precedes the latter. 2 52 Negotiating was found to be a
particularly appropriate vehicle when "States conduct maritime

249. North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;
Federal Republic Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. Rep. 3, T 19 (Feb. 20).
250. Id. ¶ 18; see supraPart V.C.3.
251. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶ 596.
252. Id. T 604.
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activities in close proximity" to each other. 2 53 As the obligation to
negotiate is an obligation of conduct, a breach of paragraph 1 of Article
83 of the LOSC could, according to the Chamber, not be assumed if the
"result expected" by one of the claimants is not met. 2 54 Important in
this regard was that Cbte d'Ivoire failed to produce any evidence of
several rounds of held negotiations spanning a six-year period not
being conducted in a meaningful manner (i.e., they did not show a lack
of good faith on the part of Ghana). 25 5 Neither could the initial
unwillingness of Ghana to bring the dispute to international
adjudication be seen as breaching the obligation to negotiate in good
faith. 25 6 One reason for this is that Article 298 of the LOSC explicitly
permits states to place certain types of disputes beyond the reach of
binding dispute settlement. 2 57 Therefore, Cate d'Ivoire seeking to
maintain the existing status quo as it deemed to exist (i.e., that no
unilateral economic conduct was taking place in the disputed area),
and the unwillingness of Ghana to accede thereto, could not be seen as
a breach of the obligation to negotiate in good faith.
The Chamber made it clear that two interrelated but separate
25 8
A
obligations are set out in paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC.
further link was recognized to exist between the two obligations in the
sense of the nature of obligation they lay down: both of these stipulated
an obligation of conduct. 2 59 The point at which paragraph 3 would
become relevant according to the Special Chamber in Ghana/Cdte
d'Ivoire is when "the maritime delimitation dispute has been
established." 2 6 0 This paragraph ceases to exert its relevance when
states have effected "a final delimitation," through the conclusion of a
delimitation agreement, or when an international court or tribunal has
26 1
delimited the maritime boundary.
. The Special Chamber abstained from engaging in an in-depth
analysis of the meaning of the positive obligation included to this aim
in paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC. This was because C6te
d'Ivoire did not frame any of its submissions along the lines of the
breach of the obligation to seek provisional arrangements, although it
made some reference to the obligation and breaches thereof in its
pleadings. 26 2 However, the Chamber did elaborate on the content of
this obligation in a broader sense by stating that it connotes an

253. Id.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id.
258. See id. ¶ 626.
259. Id. ¶¶ 626-27.
260. Id. $ 630.
261. Id.
262. See, e.g., Counter-Memorial, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the
Maritime Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cate
d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Apr. 4, 2016, at 236.
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"obligation of conduct": the states concerned have to make good faith
efforts to conclude provisional arrangements. 2 6 3 The addition of the
phrase "in a spirit of understanding and cooperation" was considered
to "enhance" this obligation. 26 4 However, it is not entirely clear how
this obligation is "enhanced," with the defining standard remaining
that states have to make good faith efforts in setting up provisional
arrangements successfully.
5. The Special Chamber's Interpretation of the Obligation to Not
Hamper or Jeopardize 2 65
Due to the strong emphasis placed by CMte d'Ivoire on the
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize, the Special Chamber began by
addressing the issue of how to define the obligation's underlying
nature. As to determine whether the obligation to not hamper or
jeopardize is an obligation of conduct (i.e., pactum de contrahendo) or
result (i.e., pactum de negotiando), forming an understanding of the
words of "shall make every effort" was regarded as critical by the
Special Chamber. It interpreted this phrase as being applicable to both
obligations in paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC. 2 6 6 This was
confirmed by the use of the word "and" linking the second limb of the
sentence to its first part. 2 67 By reaching the conclusion that there is a
good faith component attached to the obligation to not hamper or
jeopardize, the Special Chamber followed the line that the tribunal, in
its award Guyana v. Suriname, set out earlier. 2 68 Reinforcing this
position is the literature, where the view regularly emerges that the
2 69
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize is an obligation of conduct.
Following the determination as to its nature, the Chamber
acknowledged that the parties to the dispute vocalized different views
in relation to two aspects connected to paragraph 3 and the obligation
to not hamper or jeopardize as collected thereunder: first, whether it
was breached; and, second, whether paragraph 3 would be
applicable. 2 70 After concluding earlier that the acquiescence claim
could not succeed, the Chamber made it clear that a breach of

263. Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. T 627.
264. Id.
265. Id. T 629.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. In this latter case, in pinpointing the nature of the negative obligation in
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC, the tribunal construed it as to make "every effort
...
not to jeopardise or hamper the reaching of the final agreement." See Guyana v.
Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, T 465 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
269. See, e.g., Peter D. Cameron, The Rules of Engagement: Developing CrossBorder Petroleum Deposits in the North Sea and the Caribbean, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
559, 563 (2005); BIILC REPORT, supra note 5, at 21-22.
270. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶ 624.
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paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC required a disputed continental
shelf area in relation to which a unilateral act was undertaken. 2 7 1
The Special Chamber observed obiterdictum that although Ghana
suspended new drilling in the disputed area, as it was ordered to do in
the interim measures phase, "preferably" it would have done this
earlier when CMte d'Ivoire previously requested this. 2 72 This statement
probably has to be read as being in the nature of lege ferenda, rather
than grounding in a legal obligation; the Chamber did not even order
a stop to initiated drilling operations in the interim measures phase
despite Cbte d'Ivoire's request to this aim. 2 7 3
The circumstance that the areas where the unilateral conduct was
undertaken were considered to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of
Ghana, as they fell on its own side of the established boundary,
inevitably had to carry great weight according to the Chamber. 2 74 As
a result, C6te d'Ivoire's submission building on the view that the
unilateral acts were undertaken "in the Ivorian maritime area" 2 7 5
became meaningless according to the Chamber. 2 7 6 Falling back on a
formalist reasoning, by pointing to the fact that the areas were located
on Ghana's own side of the boundary, the Special Chamber made it
clear that these areas could not be considered Ivorian; hence, its
submission could not succeed. 27 7 Judge Mensah, in his separate
opinion, and in assessing whether paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the
LOSC was breached, adopted a similar argument: given that the areas
in question were attributed to Ghana in the final judgment, the issue
of infringement was a non-sequitur.2 7 8
What is problematic with these findings is that both seem to
operate on a misunderstanding of paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the
LOSC: this paragraph is concerned with whether a unilateral act
undertaken in a disputed continental shelf area, during the time that
it was disputed, had an effect of hampering or jeopardizing reaching a
delimitation agreement. Paragraph 3 is not concerned with whether
this unilateral act in hindsight (i.e., ex post facto), with the newly
acquired knowledge at one's disposal of who has exclusive jurisdiction
over the area because it lies on a state's own side of the boundary,
breached the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize. Hence, the way in
which the Special Chamber interpreted paragraph 3 renders it

271. Id. ¶ 589.
272. Id. ¶ 632.
273. See supra Part IV.C.
274. Ghana/Cdte d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. T 633.
275. Id. ¶¶ 62, 561, 598, 606, 633.
276. Id. ¶ 633.
277. Id. ¶ 633-34.
278. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Separate
¶
14,
Sept.
23,
2017,
Mensah,
Judge
Ad
Hoc
Opinion
of
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case-no.23-merits/C23J230917
SOMensah-orig.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BDC-WJTH] (archived Nov. 7, 2018).
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effectively meaningless; this is further enhanced by combining the
reasoning in regard to whether international responsibility could be
incurred with the Chamber's interpretation of paragraph 3 of Article
83 of the LOSC. 27 9
6. Acting Unilaterally in Areas Brought under the Exclusive
Jurisdiction of the Other Claimant: Can There Be International
Responsibility?
After considering that the areas where the unilateral mineral
resource activity had taken place were on Ghana's side of the
boundary, the Special Chamber made it clear that the issue it needed
to analyze was as follows: can international responsibility be engaged
when unilateral acts have been "carried out in a part of the area
attributed by the judgment to the other State?]" 280 Framed
differently, the question was, can Ghana incur international
responsibility for unilateral conduct in relation to the disputed
continental shelf area that Cbte d'Ivoire argued had resulted in a
breach of its sovereign rights, particularly infringing on their
exclusivity, even though in the final apportionment the areas were not
located on the latter's side of the boundary?
In an earlier consideration, the Special Chamber acknowledged
that Ghana's unilateral activities were, however, undertaken in what
at the time could be considered the maritime area of dispute. 28 1 Judge
Paik also emphasized this aspect in his separate opinion. 2 82 However,
the importance attributed thereto, and the conclusion Judge Paik
draws therefrom are very different from those of the Special
Chamber. 28 3
According to the Special Chamber, determining which parts of the
disputed area belonged to either Ghana or C6te d'Ivoire through
delimitation involved a prioritization of one coastal state's entitlement
to a continental shelf over the entitlement of the other coastal state
(i.e., there is a constitutive component to a delimitation 2 8 4). In the
following finding, the Special Chamber made it clear when
international responsibility would be incurred due to a breach of a rule
of international law, in case a state acts unilaterally in relation to a
disputed continental shelf area:

279. See infra Part VI.
280. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. ¶ 589.
281. Id. ¶ 588.
282. See generally Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary
between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No.
23, Separate Opinion of Judge Paik, Sept. 23, 2017.
283. Id. For more on how the view of Judge Paik differed from the majority view,
see infra Part V.C.7.
284. See supra Part V.B.5.
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In the view of the Special Chamber, the consequence of the above is that
maritime activities undertaken by a State in an area of the continental shelf
which has been attributed to another State by an international judgment cannot
be considered to be in violation of the sovereign rights of the latter if those
activities were carried out before the judgment was delivered and if the area
28
concerned was the subject of claims made in good faith by both States.

5

One implication of this finding is that if a state has acted
unilaterally in a part of a disputed continental shelf area prior to
delimitation, and that area is ultimately considered to be under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the acting state, there can be no violation of
the sovereign rights of the other coastal state, which claimed
entitlements over the same area prior to delimitation but to whom the
area was not attributed after a delimitation judgment. 2 8 6
The same holding also implies that the possibility for incurring
international responsibility by a state acting unilaterally prior to
delimitation is extremely limited. As long as the area where the act
occurred was claimed in good faith by the state acting unilaterally, it
will avoid responsibility; this is even if the area falls on the side of the
boundary of the other state after delimitation.
The Special Chamber found judicial authority for this view in the
ICJ's ruling in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.
Colombia).28 7 This case involved Nicaragua requesting the ICJ for a
declaration containing that "Colombia is not acting in accordance with
her obligations under international law by stopping and otherwise
hindering Nicaragua from accessing and disposing of her natural
resources to the east of the 82nd meridian." 28 8 Colombia contested this
assertion. One of the grounds it invoked was that states do not claim
reparation for acts that were conducted previously (i.e., prior to final
settlement) in a disputed area if the area involved is ultimately
established to be located on the side of the boundary of the state that
acted unilaterally. 2 89 Ghana also relied on this holding, in the context
of its argument that international responsibility cannot be incurred
2 90
from carrying out activities to which Cate d'Ivoire had acquiesced.
The ICJ in Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicaragua v.
Colombia) was unwilling to provide the declaration requested by
Nicaragua, to the effect that Colombia's acts undertaken in a disputed
maritime area were declared unlawful from the view of international
law. In its analysis, the ICJ placed special emphasis on the fact that

285. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Judgment), 17 ITLOS Rep. T 592.
286. Id.
287. Territorial and Maritime Dispute (Nicar. v. Colom.), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J.
Rep. 624, ¶¶ 16, 17 (Nov. 19).
288. Id. ¶ 16.
289. Id. T 249.
290. Reply of Ghana, Volume I, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te dIvoire),
Case No. 23, July 25, 2016, at 142-43.

166

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 52:121

different parts of the area in dispute were considered to be under the
jurisdiction of the different states involved. 2 9 1
By way of contrast, in the maritime boundary dispute between
Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire, the areas where exploitation activities in the
disputed maritime area were undertaken were in the final
apportionment all considered to be under the exclusive jurisdiction of
Ghana. The following consequence followed from applying the finding
of the ICJ in Territorialand MaritimeDispute (Nicaraguav. Colombia)
by analogy to the dispute between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire: even if the
areas in relation to which Ghana was on the verge of producing mineral
resources would have been considered to be under the jurisdiction of
C6te d'Ivoire, there would have been no violation of its sovereign
rights. 29 2
To use the Chamber's own words, this would be no different "even
assuming that some of those activities took place in areas attributed to
C6te d'Ivoire by the present Judgment." 2 9 3 In light of the fact that the
areas did not fall on C6te d'Ivoire's side of the established boundary, it
is not entirely clear why the Special Chamber obiter dictum stated that
this would have not been different if the area would have been
considered to be under C6te d'Ivoire's exclusive jurisdiction after
delimitation; in fact, this seems to have been a largely unnecessary
statement of the Chamber.
And the ruling on this point constitutes a clear break with what
the Special Chamber itself held in the interim measures phase, where
a risk of irreparability was tied to the area where Ghana undertook the
unilateral acts in relation to mineral resources being placed under C6te
d'Ivoire's exclusive jurisdiction; this earlier recognized risk now did no
longer exist. Perhaps this is more easily explained by the fact that
there now is an established maritime boundary.
But there is another difficulty with how the Special Chamber
framed its reasoning, particularly in light of it recognizing that the
coastal state has ab initio rights to the continental shelf.2 94 The
Chamber then subsequently assumed that there will be no breach of
these rights prior to delimitation in the following case: if a part of the
continental shelf is in dispute and claimed in good faith by a claimant
acting unilaterally, there will not be a breach of another claimant's
rights before or after delimitation. The logic laid out here by the
Chamber seemingly can only really stand up to scrutiny if the states
concerned do not have pre-existing rights to the disputed area, due to
delimitation being constitutive of these rights for states; this is a view
that was prior to this judgment highly uncommon.

291. Territorial and Maritime Dispute, 2012 I.C.J. Rep. ¶ 250.
292. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, TT 593, 594.
293. Id. ¶ 594.
294. Id. T 590.
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7. The Separate Opinion of Judge Paik: The Neglected Importance of
the Obligation to Not Hamper or Jeopardize
The separate opinion of Judge Paik contributes to a better
understanding of what the content of the obligation to not hamper or
jeopardize delimitation consists of. In this opinion, he discussed the
modalities of paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC in some detail.
What motivated Judge Paik to write this opinion was that the
Chamber neglected the relevance and practical importance of this
obligation in framing its decision.
Nonetheless, Judge Paik did not vote in favor of Cate d'Ivoire's
submission that paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC was breached.
The formulation of CMte d'Ivoire's submission on this point, referring
to the disputed area as exclusively belonging to CMte d'Ivoire, enabled
him to follow the unanimous decision that Ghana had not breached
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC. 2 95 With the benefit of hindsight,
the unilateral conduct occurred in an area that could not be considered
Ivorian. 2 96 Judge Paik made it clear that he would not have followed
the majority's view had C6te d'Ivoire's submission been worded
differently. 2 9 7 However, Judge Paik expressed his reservations in
relation to how the Chamber treated paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the
LOSC in a more general sense.
First, the Chamber, through how it framed its judgment, brushed
over the general importance and practical relevance of the obligation
298
to not hamper or jeopardize delimitation, according to Judge Paik.
And, second, he was not convinced of "the lawfulness of Ghana's
activities in the disputed area in terms of article 83, paragraph 3, of
the Convention." 29 9 After acknowledging there are two separate
obligations in paragraph 3, geared respectively towards cooperation
and abstention, Judge Paik exclusively directed his attention at the
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize. 30 0 The importance of this
obligation was signified by the assertion that it embodies "a
fundamental duty of restraint," 3 0 1 carrying significant "weight as a
fundamental norm." 30 2 Further, the obligation to not hamper or
jeopardize serves a significant practical purpose in light of disputed

295. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Separate
Opinion of Judge Paik, Sept. 23, 2017, ¶ 1.
296. Id.
297. Id.
298. See id. T 3 ("In light of its weight as a fundamental norm as well as its
practical utility, the question as to how the obligation not to jeopardize or hamper should
be interpreted and applied deserved scrutiny, but the Special Chamber's response fell
short in this respect.").
299. Id. ¶ 1.
300. Id. ¶ 2-10.
301. Id. ¶ 3.
302. Id.
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continental shelves being regular features in the international
landscape. 30 3 Judge Paik, despite acknowledging that the obligation is
"scant in substance," thought it to have been deserving of further
clarification in this judgment. 3 0 4 However, the Special Chamber
passed on the chance of offering welcome guidance on the content of
this obligation.
In analyzing the meaning of the obligation to not hamper or
jeopardize, Judge Paik started with indicating where a point of
agreement with the judgment of the Special Chamber lies: the nature
of the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize is not one of result, but
rather an obligation of conduct.3 0 5 In an attempt to circumscribe the
nature of an obligation of conduct, Judge Paik adopted the line of
approach set out in the Responsibilities and Obligations of States
Sponsoring Persons with Respect to Activities in the Area:3 0 6 states
must do their utmost to achieve the aim sought after by a provision.3 0 7
On the issue of the extent of the limitation imposed by the obligation
to not hamper or jeopardize on the possibility to act unilaterally, it was
abundantly clear in the view of Judge Paik that a moratorium was not
meant to be introduced. 3 08 This aspect was borne out by both the
language of paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC and its negotiating
history.3 0 9 As a result, C6te d'Ivoire's contention that "activities by the
States concerned" in a disputed maritime area must be abjured in a
comprehensive sense could not succeed. 3 10 As regards to how the
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize delimitation interacts with the
obligation to seek provisional arrangements, both being collected
under the same paragraph 3, Judge Paik held that the obligation to not
hamper or jeopardize would "be particularly relevant" where there are
no provisional arrangements into effect, or when the arrangement in
question is not comprehensive in nature.3 1 1 Most provisional
arrangements are not comprehensive in scope, however, keeping alive
the possibility of conflict arising concerning those types of acts that are
unregulated by these arrangements.
The question of what acts are captured under this obligation's
reach takes on a particular urgency in light of there being no
elaboration on what unilateral acts exert an effect of hampering or

303. Id.
304. Id.
305. Id. ¶ 4.
306. Id.; see also Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons
with Respect to Activities in the Area, Case No. 17, Advisory Opinion, Feb. 1, 2011, 10
ITLOS Rep. 10, T 110.
307. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and C~te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Separate
Opinion of Judge Paik, Sept. 23, 2017, ¶ 4.
308. Id. ¶ 5.
309. Id.
310. Id.
311. Id.
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jeopardizing. According to Judge Paik, deciding what unilateral
conduct is (un)lawful in the disputed maritime area involved had to be
measured by the impact made on the chances of successfully reaching
a delimitation, or on negotiations if they are being, or have been,
pursued to that end. Construed thus, a breach of the obligation to not
hamper or jeopardize becomes entwined to the circumstances at
hand. 3 12 This aspect of the specific situation present in a disputed area
is what rendered the distinguishing between lawful and unlawful acts
in abstracto a futile exercise, in the view of Judge Paik.
Despite acknowledging the dependency of this assessment on the
specific circumstances of a disputed maritime area, some measure of
approximation of this scope is possible: but the caveat is that an act is
likely to be lawful or unlawful, but no absolute determinations can be
made. With regard to acts resulting in "a permanent physical change
to the marine environment," 3 1 3 chances are that they have an effect of
prejudicing the final agreement. However, activities effecting change
falling short thereof, can just as well have an effect of hampering or
jeopardizing. 3 1 4 Therefore, holding the causation of permanent
physical change to be the defining standard against which to measure
the lawfulness of a unilateral act is misplaced. Rather, this criterion
forms one "relevant factor" among "several" influencing the scope for
unilateralism in relation to a disputed continental shelf area. And
there is also no hierarchical ordering between these factors. So, the
threshold of "a permanent physical change to the marine environment"
does not necessarily prevail over any other factors that can be
identified. 3 1 5 Judge Paik, who focused mainly on the unilateral act as
such, and the effects it exerted on a particular maritime boundary
dispute, subsequently adduced a list of relevant factors: "type, nature,
location, and time" combined with the "manner in which they are
carried out" are all relevant in ascertaining whether a unilateral act is
3 16
reconcilable with the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize.
Ghana must have become fully aware that there was a dispute
with C6te d'Ivoire at some moment in time, certainly no later than in
2009.317 Rather than subsequently adopting a posture of restraint,
which seemed necessary, Ghana stepped up the frequency with which
it undertook activities within the disputed maritime area; this

312. Id. ¶ 6; see also Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra note 3, at 185-86.
313. Guyana v. Suriname, 30 R.I.A.A. 1, T 467 (Perm. Ct. Arb. 2007).
314. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and Cbte d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Separate
Opinion of Judge Paik, Sept. 23, 2017, T 7; see also Van Logchem Unilateralism,supra
note 3, at 185-86.
315. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Separate
Opinion of Judge Paik, Sept. 23, 2017, ¶ 7.
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intensification was in the view of Judge Paik not reconcilable with the
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize delimitation. 3 18
Ghana's unilateral activities were undertaken in areas that were
ex post facto considered to be under its exclusive jurisdiction (i.e., they
fell on Ghana's side of the boundary line); however, this aspect should
according to Judge Paik not factor into the determination of breach of
the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize. Lying behind this argument
was the assumption that paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC applies
exclusively to the period preceding continental shelf delimitation;
therefore, assessing whether a unilateral act breaches the paragraph
must be fully set in the moment of the act being undertaken.3 1 9
Taking the opposite view, that a unilateral act undertaken in a
disputed maritime area loses its unlawful character depending on
whether that part of the area is placed under that state's jurisdiction
after delimitation, would deprive the obligation to not hamper or
jeopardize delimitation of the continental shelf of the main aim that it
is meant to serve: 3 2 0 ensuring that unilateral acts undertaken pending
delimitation do not hamper or jeopardize the success of reaching the
final delimitation.

VI. THE IMPLICATIONS OF GHANA/O^)TE DIVOIRE FOR THE RIGHTS AND
OBLIGATIONS OF STATES IN DISPUTED MARITIME AREAS: A
MUDDYING OF THE WATERS?

A key determinant for the relevance of the judgment of the Special
Chamber in relation to the issue of the scope that remains for
unilateralism in disputed maritime areas concerning mineral
resources was the success of Ghana's acquiescence claim. This line of
argument did not convince the Special Chamber, however: the evidence
adduced fell short of meeting the required threshold of being
compelling. 32 1
As a result, the judgment can be analyzed through the lens of the
added value for determining the rights and obligations states have in
relation to a disputed continental shelf area. Now, to revert to the main
question this Article sought to answer: what lessons can be learned
from the maritime boundary dispute between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire
in relation to the issue of what the rights and obligations are of states
in disputed continental shelf areas, and in relation to what scope is
reserved for unilateral conduct to access the mineral resources located
therein?
Ghana's moving to the advanced stage of being on the verge of
taking wells in a disputed area into production makes this case the
first in its kind: an international court and tribunal was asked to rule
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on the lawfulness of a state being close to exploiting mineral resources
from a disputed maritime area, as well as on the lawfulness of the
preliminary acts undertaken enabling Ghana to progress to this stage.
Based on the previous case law, the following answer was likely to be
given to the question about how to view the unilateral acts of Ghana
from the perspective of international law: these activities are unlawful,
given that exploratory and exploitation drilling result in irreparable
damage to the rights of the other claimant, combined with that it would
significantly risk damaging the marine environment, modifying the
characteristics of the seabed to a degree that the resultant damage
would be irreparable.
In the interim measures phase, signs of a break with previous case
law started to first emerge. The Chamber, falling short of suspending
all drilling,3 2 2 ordered Ghana to abstain only from new drilling in the
disputed maritime area. Leaving those operations already set in
motion unaffected was motivated by other environmental
considerations and financial repercussions simultaneously in play,
which both argued against this, according to the Chamber. In its
interim measures order, the Chamber recognized that "exploration and
exploitation activities" raised the threat of irreparability to rights; a
right to information existing for the coastal state in relation to the
composition of the continental shelf similarly was considered to be
under threat. 3 23 By recognizing a risk of irreparability to flow from the
unilateral collection of information, in this regard, the order of the
Special Chamber went beyond what was earlier held in case law. This
risk of irreparability coming to fruition was, in the interim measures
phase, tied to the area under consideration ultimately being under
CMte d'Ivoire's exclusive jurisdiction. At first glance, the view espoused
here by the Chamber shows some resemblance to Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf (interim measures), where the ICJ in its decision held
that a risk of irreparable prejudice engendered by unilateral seismic
work was dependent on the area where the work took place to be
considered under the exclusive jurisdiction of Greece. 3 24 However, and
importantly, the ICJ thought this line of reasoning could only be
applied to seismic work, not to exploratory drilling and exploitation
activities, including bringing installations into position. 32 5 In the view
of the ICJ, had one of these latter categories of unilateral activity been

322. Two of the several requests made by Cate dIvoire were: first, ordering Ghana
to abort operations in the disputed area completely; and, second, ordering Ghana not to
award any new permits to the petroleum industry that intruded upon the disputed area
for the duration of the Chamber not having handed down its ruling on the merits. See,
e.g., Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana and
C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Provisional
Measures, Order of Apr. 25, 2015, 15 ITLOS Rep. 146, T 25.
323. Id. ¶¶ 94-95; see supra Part IV.C.
324. Aegean Sea Continental Shelf Case (Greece v. Turkey), Request for the
Indication of Interim Measures of Protection, Order, 1976 I.C.J. Rep. 3, T 31 (Sept. 11).
325. Id. ¶ 30.
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undertaken, it would have offered interim protection to the end of
prohibiting these types of acts from being undertaken pendente litis.
These deviations from the previous case law have become more
pronounced in the judgment on the merits. Parts of the judgment on
the merits are (similarly) largely irreconcilable with what was held in
the interim measures phase. While earlier recognizing a danger of
causing irreparable prejudice to rights,3 2 6 the materialization of this
risk would result from the following unilateral activities: gathering
information, and conducting exploration and exploitation activities.3 2 7
Although none of the areas in dispute fell on C6te d'Ivoire's side of the
established boundary, the Special Chamber addressed obiter dictum as
to when a breach of the sovereign rights of CMte d'Ivoire, possibly
incurring international responsibility, would have occurred: this would
be limited to if a claimant lacking a good faith claim over the disputed
area would act in connection therewith unilaterally.
Ghana contended that acts in relation to mineral resources formed
part of the status quo existing between itself and CMte d'Ivoire; being a
constituent part thereof, they could not be assumed to have an effect of
hampering or jeopardizing delimitation. 32 8 The main element having
shaped the current and relevant status quo was, in the view of Ghana,
CMte d'Ivoire's acquiescence, with the result that the undertaken acts
had become an integral part of this status quo; hence, there could be
no breach of paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC.
The treatment the Special Chamber gave to paragraph 3 was
minimal, dismissing the paragraph's relevance based on a highly
formalistic reasoning. After pronouncing itself on the nature of the
obligation (i.e., forming an obligation of conduct) and stating that it is
predominantly relevant in the absence of agreed provisional
arrangements, the analysis of the Chamber in terms of paragraph 3 of
Article 83 of the LOSC does not progress much beyond this point; this
was due to the way in which C6te d'Ivoire committed its submission to
paper.3 2 9 Given that the paragraph applies in areas of disputed
continental shelf, framing its submission in terms of the assertion that
these acts occurred with the maritime zones of C6te d'Ivoire could be
easily brushed aside as anticipating events which would have yet to
come to pass, or perhaps not at all if the area was attributed to Ghana,
as it ultimately was. Hence, this framing by Cbte d'Ivoire of its
submission that Ghana's unilateral acts occurred in the "Ivorian
maritime area" was unfortunate. Yet the submission of CMte d'Ivoire

326. Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire (Provisional Measures), 15 ITLOS Rep. TT 94-95.
327. Id. NT 95-96.
328. Reply of Ghana, Volume I, Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/Cbte d'Ivoire),
Case No. 23, July 25, 2016, at 137.
329. Dispute Concerning Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between Ghana
and C6te d'Ivoire in the Atlantic Ocean (Ghana/C6te d'Ivoire), Case No. 23, Judgment of
Sept. 23, 2017, 17 ITLOS Rep. 1, TT 62, 561, 598, 606, 633.
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was concerned with a larger area than the area up to the equidistance
boundary line as determined by the Chamber. Therefore, dismissing
C6te d'Ivoire's submission on the ground that it was mainly concerned
with the area up to the equidistance line cannot completely convince in
the view of this author. 3 30
To dismiss the relevance of this paragraph on the ground of the
area in question not being ultimately considered to be on C~te d'Jvoire's
side of the established boundary roots in a misunderstanding of
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC by the Chamber. This is because
the paragraph is not meant to function as a tool to determine ex post
facto (i.e., after delimitation) the lawfulness of a unilateral acts
undertaken prior thereto, by setting this determination in the time of
it becoming clear where the boundary lies. Rather, paragraph 3 is
meant to exert its relevance prior to delimitation: pursuant to which
acts undertaken unilaterally prior to delimitation, and which have an
effect of hampering or jeopardizing the final delimitation can be
considered unlawful. The unconvincing interpretation of the Special
Chamber of paragraph 3 seems to be entwined with another
unconvincing set of considerations with regard to whether
international responsibility could be incurred.3 3 1 In turn, both the
elements-that there was no breach of the obligation to not hamper or
jeopardize nor was international responsibility incurred for violations
alleged by C6te d'Ivoire on its sovereign rights through Ghana's
unilateral acts-can be considered to be connected with the Special
Chamber's finding that delimitation is not exclusively declarative. 3 32
Had CMte d'Ivoire's submission been framed differently, Judge
Paik indicated he would have voted in favor of a breach of paragraph 3
of Article 83 of the LOSC. Yet a broader question is how likely would
it have been that the ultimate outcome of the majority's decision would
have been similarly different, had the submission been worded
differently? The Chamber's analysis on the point of incurring
international responsibility provides for a bleak forecast that this
would have been the case. Although, from the perspective of logic, it
would have made more sense to discuss the aspect of whether
paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the LOSC was breached before the Special
Chamber addressed the issue of international responsibility, its
analysis of paragraph 3 was reserved to a later point in the judgment.
By placing this analysis after dealing with the issue of international
responsibility, the Chamber seems to suggest that international

330. On this issue, see generally Atsuko Kanehara, A Legal and Practical
Arrangement of Disputes ConcerningMaritime Boundaries Pending theirFinal Solution
and Law Enforcement: From a Japanese Perspective, in SERVING THE RULE OF
INTERNATIONAL MARITIME LAw: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR DAVID JOSEPH
ATIARD 95 (Norman. A. Martinez Guti6rrez ed., 2010).
331. See supra Part V.C.6.
332. See supra Part V.C.3.
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responsibility could not have been incurred by breaching this
paragraph.
The obligation to not hamper or jeopardize imposes a de facto, not
de jure limitation on when claimed rights may be put to actual use by
coastal states in a disputed area. Yet the practical possibility for
claimant states to undertake unilateral acts in relation to disputed
EEZ or continental shelf areas is reduced to those acts conforming to
the obligation to not hamper or jeopardize.3 3 3 The existence of preexisting rights to the disputed maritime area of coastal states, which
can be breached, is the precondition on which paragraph 3 of Article 83
of the LOSC operates. What the Special Chamber seemingly failed to
recognize, however, is that the extent to which claimants can exercise
sovereign rights over the disputed continental shelf area prior to
delimitation is largely governed by paragraph 3. So, construed thus,
the argument can be made that it would have been essential for the
Special Chamber to address the meaning of paragraph 3 in light of
C6te d'Ivoire's contention that its sovereign rights were infringed upon,
because of the unilateral acts undertaken by Ghana, irrespective of
Cbte d'Ivoire's failure to directly contend that paragraph 3 was
breached in this particular way.
The Special Chamber seems to employ a different definition of
delimitation being constitutive than used in earlier case law.
Departing from the view that delimitation is merely declarative of
rights, it assigns to delimitation a dual nature in that it carries both
constitutive and declarative aspects. A difficulty with this view is
disentangling those parts of delimitation that are declarative in nature
from those that are constitutive; for example, is delimitation
constitutive of the rights coastal states have over the continental shelf,
rendering, as Ghana suggested in its pleadings, a disputed maritime
area essentially terra nullius prior thereto; or, rather, is perhaps the
feature of the exclusive character of rights entwined with completing a
delimitation?
Looking at the reasoning that unfolded after the Special Chamber
construed the nature of delimitation as being composed of both
declarative and constitutive components, particularly concerning
international responsibility and whether paragraph 3 of Article 83 of
the LOSC was breached, strongly suggests that the Special Chamber
considers delimitation to be mainly constitutive of rights. 33 4 This is
because the outcome of the Chamber's decision on these two points is
difficult to reconcile with delimitation indeed being declarative of preexisting rights; in other words, sovereign rights for coastal states do
not seem to exist, or alternatively cannot be breached, which seems to
undercut the essence of possessing rights.

333. See Van Logchem Unilateralism, supra note 3, at 195 (saying the obligation
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334. See supra Part V.C.3.
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Perhaps, however, an alternative explanation might be that the
Special Chamber construed the relation between having an
entitlement to a continental shelf and the Chamber's delimitation
judgment as that related rights will become exclusive in nature once
the maritime boundary has been established by the Chamber. Under
that view, prior to delimitation there is a coexistence of rights with
none of the states concerned being able to fall back on their exclusive
nature; in a way there would be a cancelling out of this aspect of
exclusiveness due to these co-existing sets of rights. The final judgment
will clarify the exact extent of a state's sovereign rights over the
continental shelf, whereby the coastal state's exercise of these related
rights will become complete. On this interpretation, the constitutive
aspect of the judgment would lie in that the exercise of a coastal state's
sovereign rights is no longer qualified due to another coastal state
claiming similar rights, but that after delimitation it can fully exercise
these rights in areas considered to be under the exclusive jurisdiction
of one coastal state.
However that may be, what remains highly unsatisfactory with
the judgment of the Chamber is when international responsibility can
be engaged for unilateral acts undertaken in relation to a disputed
continental shelf area: the sovereign rights the coastal state has over
the continental shelf, which are ab initio and ipso facto, cannot be
breached by another claimant state unless it lacks a good faith claim
over a disputed maritime area, putting into question how inherent and
exclusive these rights really are.
By assigning delimitation at least partly a constitutive effect, the
Special Chamber does not render the disputed area "no one's waters";
this is because having an entitlement to the continental shelf area
shapes the possibility to act in relation thereto. Instead, the Chamber
renders the area as waters in relation to which claimants holding a
good faith claim can act freely and without the threat of incurring
responsibility ex post facto, for acting during the time that the area is
disputed. According to the Chamber, if a state has a good faith claim,
no international responsibility will be incurred, even if ex post facto the
area is located on the side of the boundary of the other nonacting,
coastal state. 3 35
Because of delimitation's partial constitutive nature, as the
reasoning of the Chamber implies, paragraph 3 of Article 83 of the
LOSC is seemingly also deprived of much significance: breaching the
obligation to not hamper or jeopardize is tied to when a state, lacking
a good faith claim, would act unilaterally in relation to a disputed
maritime area. This can function as an incentive for unilateral action
by states with good faith claims in such disputed maritime areas,
leading to the question whether the direction established by the
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Special Chamber is commendable in dealing with such areas, which
will be explored next.

VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON BROADER IMPLICATIONS FOR DISPUTED
MARITIME AREAS: DOES THE JUDGMENT PROVIDE CAUSE FOR

ALARM?

Broader (adverse) consequences may flow from the judgment of
the Special Chamber. A source for concern is that the Special Chamber
has provided a state that wants to undertake acts unilaterally within
a disputed continental shelf area with the judicial authority to do so.
An implication of setting the threshold as to whether a unilateral act
can be lawfully undertaken at when that part of the disputed maritime
area is claimed in good faith by the state means that a unilateral act
can practically always proceed in relation to a disputed continental
shelf area, seemingly without incurring international responsibility;
this is even if the area after delimitation is part of the other claimant's
maritime zone.
Other effects that might follow from a claimant undertaking acts
unilaterally, including detrimental effects on the bilateral relations
between states are, for example, excluded from consideration by
following this new "path" of the Chamber. Focusing exclusively on the
validity of the claim of a coastal state implies that all other arguments
arguing in favor of adopting more restraint in such areas-including
that unilateral acts concerning mineral resources are regularly highly
controversial, may prompt protests, and may breed new acts of
unilateralism in response-are excluded by the Chamber as relevant
considerations. The aspect of preserving the exclusivity that is
attached to states' sovereign rights over the continental shelf, and the
resources contained therein, was not deemed a relevant consideration
6
by the Chamber. 33
Merely requiring that the area is claimed in good faith is not a
very demanding requirement. It significantly lowers the bar for states
seeking to act unilaterally in relation to a disputed continental shelf
area. Following this argument, in a more general sense and by
applying it by analogy to other disputed maritime areas, particularly
those that regularly create conflict and where unilateral acts are
recurrent sources of tension between claimant states, the reasoning of
the Special Chamber cannot but have negative effects. This is
especially true because it effectively offers the claimant states
concerned a carte blanche to act unilaterally in relation to their
disputed continental shelf area.
Whether the judgment of the Special Chamber is a sign of a
significant shift in the wrong direction remains to be seen, however.
Or, rather, an alternative argument would be that the specifics of the
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dispute between Ghana and C6te d'Ivoire were of such central
importance in shaping the outcome of the judgment of the Chamber
that drawing more general conclusions as to the state of international
law in relation to disputed maritime areas from it is inappropriate.
Particularly, the aspect that Ghana was already in a very advanced
stage of development of the disputed maritime area, being close to
production, is relevant under this view. Had the Chamber ruled
differently, serious financial consequences might have followed for
Ghana and its concessionaires. Investors would inevitably pull out
from earlier commitments, which would lead to the abandonment of all
development of mineral resources in the near future, and would also
leave the equipment already moved into place to deteriorate up to a
point where it could no longer properly function.
The next judgment that can add to the discussion as to the issue
of what the rights and obligations are of states in disputed maritime
areas, and which might offer a better indication in which direction
judicial opinion is moving, is perhaps the maritime boundary dispute
between Kenya and Somalia, where the latter complained of the
unlawfulness of unilateral acts undertaken by Kenya.3 3 7 A return to
the line set out previously in Guyana v. Suriname, although also
flawed on certain points, is very much preferable to following the
Chamber's judgment in Ghana/C6ted'Ivoire.
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